University of Pennsylvania

ScholarlyCommons
Legal Studies and Business Ethics Papers

Wharton Faculty Research

2008

The Centripetal Network: How the Internet Holds Itself Together,
and the Forces Tearing It Apart
Kevin Werbach
University of Pennsylvania

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/lgst_papers
Part of the Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics Commons

Recommended Citation
Werbach, K. (2008). The Centripetal Network: How the Internet Holds Itself Together, and the Forces
Tearing It Apart. UC Davis Law Review, 42 (2), 343-412. Retrieved from https://repository.upenn.edu/
lgst_papers/31

This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/lgst_papers/31
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.

The Centripetal Network: How the Internet Holds Itself Together, and the Forces
Tearing It Apart
Abstract
Two forces are in tension as the Internet evolves. One pushes toward interconnected common platforms;
the other pulls toward fragmentation and proprietary alternatives. Their interplay drives many of the
contentious issues in cyberlaw, intellectual property, and telecommunications policy, including the fight
over network neutrality for broadband providers, debates over global Internet governance, and battles over
copyright online. These are more than just conflicts between incumbents and innovators, or between
openness and deregulation. Their roots lie in the fundamental dynamics of interconnected networks.
Fortunately, there is an interdisciplinary literature on network properties, albeit one virtually unknown to
legal scholars. The emerging field of network formation theory explains the pressures threatening to pull
the Internet apart, and suggests responses. The Internet as we know it is surprisingly fragile. To continue
the extraordinary outpouring of creativity and innovation that the Internet fosters, policy-makers must
protect its composite structure against both fragmentation and excessive concentration of power.
This paper, the first to apply network formation models to Internet law, shows how the Internet pulls itself
together as a coherent whole. This very process, however, creates and magnifies imbalances that
encourage balkanization. By understanding how networks behave, governments and other legal decisionmakers can avoid unintended consequences and target their actions appropriately. A network-theoretic
perspective holds great promise to inform the law and policy of the information economy.

Disciplines
Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics

This journal article is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/lgst_papers/31

DRAFT. Please do not quote without permission.

THE CENTRIPETAL NETWORK:
How the Internet Holds Itself Together,
and the Forces Tearing it Apart
By Kevin Werbach
UC Davis Law Review, Vol. 42, p. 343 (2009)

Abstract
Two forces are in tension as the Internet evolves. One pushes toward
interconnected common platforms; the other pulls toward fragmentation and
proprietary alternatives. Their interplay drives many of the contentious issues
in cyberlaw, intellectual property, and telecommunications policy, including the
fight over “network neutrality” for broadband providers, debates over global
Internet governance, and battles over copyright online. These are more than
just conflicts between incumbents and innovators, or between “openness” and
“deregulation.” The roots of these conflicts lie in the fundamental dynamics of
interconnected networks.
Fortunately, there is an interdisciplinary literature on network properties,
albeit one virtually unknown to legal scholars. The emerging field of network
formation theory explains the pressures threatening to pull the Internet apart,
and suggests responses. The Internet as we know it is surprisingly fragile. To
continue the extraordinary outpouring of creativity and innovation that the
Internet fosters, policy makers must protect its composite structure against both
fragmentation and excessive concentration of power.
This paper, the first to apply network formation models to Internet law,
shows how the Internet pulls itself together as a coherent whole. This very
process, however, creates and magnifies imbalances that encourage
balkanization. By understanding how networks behave, governments and
other legal decision makers can avoid unintended consequences and target their
actions appropriately. A network-theoretic perspective holds great promise to
inform the law and policy of the information economy.

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1118435

DRAFT. Please do not quote without permission.
Introduction .................................................................................. 1
I. The Fate of the Internet ............................................................. 4
A. Network Dynamics ................................................................................ 4
B.
“Rumors on the Internets” ................................................................... 5
C.
The Network at War with Itself ............................................................. 7
II. The Path to Balkanization .......................................................10
A. Internet Governance: Operational Balkanization ............................... 11
1.
Internet Addressing ..........................................................................12
2.
Address fragmentation ..................................................................... 15
3.
China’s IPv6 strategy ....................................................................... 18
4.
The politics of balkanization ............................................................ 22
B. Network Infrastructure: Service Balkanization ................................. 25
1.
Terms of network interconnection .................................................. 26
2.
Fearing for peering .......................................................................... 27
C.
Network Neutrality and Application Balkanization ........................... 32
D. Digital Copyright: Information Balkanization ................................... 36
1.
Linkage at the content layer ............................................................ 36
2.
Breakdown of voluntary content reuse ........................................... 40
III. Network Formation Dynamics ............................................. 42
A. A New Science ...................................................................................... 43
B. Network Formation Theory ................................................................. 45
1.
In general ......................................................................................... 45
2.
Random network formation ............................................................ 47
3.
Strategic network formation ............................................................ 48
C.
Disproportionate Power: Small Worlds and Scale-Free Dynamics ... 52
1.
It is a small world after all ............................................................... 52
2.
Scale-free networks: the rich get richer .......................................... 54
IV. One Network or Many? .......................................................... 57
A. How the Internet Came Together ....................................................... 58
1.
The ends as the means ..................................................................... 58
2.
Connected by design ........................................................................ 59
B. Federated Network Effects .................................................................. 62
1.
Bigger is better ................................................................................. 62
2.
Benefits of federation ....................................................................... 63
C.
Network Science Meets Network Law ................................................. 65
1.
The challenge for law ....................................................................... 65
2.
Defining the government role .......................................................... 66
3.
Early analytical work ....................................................................... 68
D. Guidelines for Policy Makers .............................................................. 69
Conclusion ................................................................................... 71

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1118435

THE CENTRIPETAL NETWORK:
How the Internet Holds Itself Together,
and the Forces Tearing it Apart
By Kevin Werbach*
UC Davis Law Review, Vol. 42, p. 343 (2009)

INTRODUCTION
“Sadly, it looks like the period in which the Internet functions seamlessly
is over.”1 — Vint Cerf

Two forces are in tension as the Internet evolves. One pushes toward
interconnected common platforms; the other pulls toward fragmentation and
proprietary alternatives. The interplay of these forces drives many of the
contentious issues in cyberlaw, intellectual property, and telecommunications
policy. These issues include the fight over “network neutrality”2 for broadband
Assistant Professor of Legal Studies and Business Ethics, The Wharton School,
University of Pennsylvania. Thanks to Richard Shell, Phil Weiser, James Grimmelman,
Gerry Faulhaber, and the participants in the 2007 Wharton Colloquium on Media and
Communications Law for advice on prior versions, and to Paul Kleindorfer for
introducing me to the network formation literature. Thanks also to Julie Dohm and
Lauren Murphy Pringle for research assistance. Contact: werbach@wharton.upenn.edu.
*

1 Rana Foroohar, The Internet Splits Up, NEWSWEEK INT’L, May 15, 2006, at 38,
available at http://www.newsweek.com/id/47643. Vint Cerf, co-creator of the core
Internet protocol, is often called the “Father of the Internet.”
2 See Kevin Werbach, Only Connect, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1234, 1269-70; Tim Wu,
Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. 141,
143 (2003) [hereinafter Wu, Network Neutrality]; Tim Wu, The Broadband Debate, A
User's Guide, 3 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. 69, 86 (2004); Christopher S. Yoo,
Beyond Network Neutrality, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 37-39 (2005) [hereinafter Yoo,
Beyond Network Neturality]; Christopher S. Yoo, Network Neutrality and the

The Centripetal Network

Kevin Werbach

providers, debates over global Internet governance, and battles over online
copyright protection. These are more than just conflicts between incumbents and
innovators, or between “openness” and “deregulation.” The roots of these battles
lie in the fundamental dynamics of interconnected networks. Fortunately, there
is an interdisciplinary literature on network properties, albeit one virtually
unknown to legal scholars.3 The emerging field of network formation theory
explains the pressures threatening to pull the Internet apart and suggests
responses.4 The Internet as we know it is surprisingly fragile.5 To continue the
extraordinary creativity and innovation that the Internet has and continues to
foster, policy makers must protect its composite structure6 against both
fragmentation and excessive concentration of power.
Network formation theory helps explain the pressures around network
integration that promote such beneficial interconnection on the Internet and the
countervailing forces at work today.7 A new branch in the broader field of
network science, network formation theory models what happens as networks
add and remove connections. Among other things, network formation theory
shows that, as networks develop, they create new dominant nodes within the
interconnected environment.8 As the network’s hubs grow increasingly powerful,
they accumulate a growing share of value. This creates two sources of tension.
Those in the hubs see the opportunity to become more proprietary, and those
outside the hubs worry that the hubs will dominate them. Both tendencies
produce reactions that mitigate the network’s connectivity and all the value it
creates.9

Economics of Congestion, 94 GEO. L.J. 1847, 1900-04 (2006) [hereinafter Yoo,
Economics of Congestion].
See infra note 178.
3 See Katherine J. Strandburg et al., Law and the Science of Networks: An Overview
and an Application to the “Patent Explosion,” 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1293, 1295 n.6
(2006) (“The application of network science to law is in its infancy.”).
4

See infra Part III.

5

See infra Part II.

6

See infra Part I.B.

7 See generally Matthew O. Jackson, The Stability and Efficiency of Economic and
Social Networks, in ADVANCES IN ECONOMIC DESIGN 319 (S. Koray & M. Sertel eds., 2003)
(summarizing the findings of network formation theory).
8

See infra Part III.

9

See infra Part III.C.
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Network formation theory provides new insights for important legal and
policy issues. For instance, China’s efforts to develop its own Internet addressing
systems represent a potential threat to the basic functioning of the Internet.10
Moreover, the greatest danger that telephone and cable companies may pose to
the Internet is not their discriminatory treatment of certain online content, but
their consolidation of Internet backbone infrastructure.11
Furthermore,
overzealous extension of online copyright protection threatens not only
independent content creators, but also the massive constellation of businesses
built on top of Internet search engines. Policy makers must appreciate these
risks and the dangers that common platforms create when they become
restrictive monopolies.12
Understanding Internet development through the lens of network formation
theory also contributes to the larger project of network law. In light of the
growing economic and social significance of the Internet, skirmishes between
network operators, content providers, users, equipment manufacturers, and
governments have exploded along a variety of legal fronts. Traditional notions of
property rights or competition policy are ill suited for this new environment.13
Yet efforts to develop novel legal frameworks for cyberspace have largely failed on
both descriptive and normative grounds.14
Network science, with its rigorous grounding in both abstract mathematics
and empirical studies, can provide the basis for a new approach to cyberspace
law. Until now, although a few findings of network science researchers have
received attention in legal scholarship, the network formation theories detailed
here have not.15 This article begins the process of applying network formation
theory to Internet law and policy.

10

See infra Part II.A.3.

11 Backbones are the Internet’s long-distance links between local access networks. See
infra Part II.B.2.
12 For a discussion of information platforms and their legal significance, see infra Part
IV.C.1.
13

See infra Part IV.C.1id.

In other words, these new approaches neither described the actual behavior of
private and governmental actors on the Internet nor offered sufficient guidance for policy
makers. See JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET? ILLUSIONS OF A
BORDERLESS WORLD 142 (2006).
14

As of this writing, the sole reference in the LEXIS U.S. Law Review database to the
extensive network formation writings of Stanford professor Matthew O. Jackson, a
leading scholar in the field, is a footnote disclaiming the authors’ intent to address this
15
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Part I outlines the structure of the Internet and the tensions it experiences
between pressures toward centralization and decentralization. Part II provides
four major case studies of Internet fragmentation: addressing and governance,
backbone interconnection, network neutrality, and content reuse. Part III
explores how network formation theory and other findings from network science
explain these developments. Part IV uses the teachings of network formation
theory to analyze the history and development of the Internet. It then suggests
an approach for Internet law based on network formation principles.

I. THE FATE OF THE INTERNET
A. Centralizing and Decentralizing Forces
Like the railroad system or the electric power grid, the Internet is a collection
of independent networks that coordinate their actions, forming what appears to
be a seamless collective. This structure allows all users, application creators, and
content providers to leverage the full power of the global inter-network.17 The
Internet fosters innovation by eliminating transaction costs, enabling new
services to emerge.18 Today, however, centrifugal19 forces of dissolution are
ascendant.20 The growing potential for balkanization21 poses grave threats to the
Internet as an engine of innovation, economic growth, and creative expression.
The Internet thrives because its powerful inward-pulling, or “centripetal,”22
forces promote interconnection and federation at every layer of functionality.23
body of research. See infra note 242. The phrase “network formation theory” does not
appear in the database.
17

See infra Part IV.B.

18

See infra Part II.C.

19

See supra note 22.

20

See infra Part II.

21 As used in this paper, “balkanization” means dissolution into distinct and
potentially hostile sub-units. No connection to the geographical region of the Balkan
Mountains in Eastern Europe or the geopolitical history of that part of the world is
implied.

22

The terms “centripetal” and “centrifugal” are used generically in this paper to
describe inward-pulling and out-pulling forces. The terms come from Newtonian physics,
but are not intended to refer to any specific physical phenomenon. See LAWRENCE S.
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The very name, “Internet,” is short for “inter-network.” The Internet is a
compound system that manifests itself as a single entity. When President George
W. Bush declared during a 2004 debate with John Kerry that, “I hear rumors on
the Internets that we’re going to have a draft,” his use of the plural form was
widely viewed as a gaffe.33 It is not obvious, however, why there is only one
Internet, and not many Internets.
The Internet pulls together heterogeneous parts and turns them into a
seemingly uniform whole. Devices, applications, and network links may have
different capabilities. Users may choose to purchase different levels of access but
these are local variations within the Internet environment, not choices among
competing Internets.34
The existence of one unified Internet creates tremendous benefits because the
network experiences what economists call increasing returns to scale.35 More
users, network operators, device manufacturers, service providers, and content
creators sharing a common environment produce a virtuous circle of
exponentially greater value (both economic and social).36 Each user can access
more resources (or other users) and each provider can reach more customers in a
federated environment. To take just a few examples, any user can exchange
email with more than a billion other global Internet users; entrepreneurs can
launch services like eBay or YouTube on top of the network and quickly turn
them into multi-billion dollar businesses; and Google can index billions of pages
to both organize the world’s information and power a phenomenally profitable
and targeted advertising business.

LERNER, PHYSICS FOR SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS 129-30 (1996) (defining centripetal and
centrifugal force).
23 See infra Part I.B. As used in this paper, “interconnection” is the linkage of two
networks. “Federation” is a deeper integration into a single virtual network.
33 James Harding, A Draw Is as Good as a Win for Bush's Relieved Supporters, FIN.
TIMES, Oct. 11, 2004, at 7.
34

See infra Part IV.A.

See infra Part IV.B; see also W. BRIAN ARTHUR, INCREASING RETURNS AND PATH
DEPENDENCE IN THE ECONOMY 1-4 (1994) (describing concept of increasing returns);
George Gilder, Metcalfe's Law and Legacy, FORBES ASAP, Sept. 13, 1993, at S158
(explaining significance of increasing returns for telecommunications).
35

36 Network operators such as AT&T and Comcast operate physical networks that
carry communications or data traffic. Device manufacturers build end-user devices such
as personal computers, mobile phones, and iPods. Service providers, as used in this
paper, are companies such as Google, eBay, and Amazon.com, which deliver functionality
to customers using the Internet.
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There are other significant benefits to the Internet’s federated structure.
Common networks facilitate innovation independent of the infrastructure
platform, which can create significantly more value than the network itself.37 In
other words, a company such as Amazon.com need not worry about how its
customers access the network. It can deploy new services and features without
making special arrangements with network operators. Furthermore, open
platforms promote democratic values of individual expression and
empowerment.38 Finally, interconnected networks may foster economic growth
by unleashing the diversity of human communication.39
Nonetheless, the absence of alternative Internets is not a foregone conclusion.
Many analogous platforms are balkanized in ways the Internet is not. There are
multiple stock markets, even though these are networked exchanges like the
Internet. Any telephone can call any other, but in the United States, a mobile
phone from one carrier usually cannot be used to subscribe to another carrier.
There are two competing formats for high-definition DVD players, despite the
obvious benefits of standardization.40 Even in the history of digital information
networks, the Internet’s uniformity is the exception, rather than the rule. It took
years for the dominant consumer online services such as AOL and Compuserve to
even offer fully interoperable email, for example.41

37 See Brett Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons
Management, 89 MINN. L. REV. 917, 937 (2005) (noting that commons management
principle “catalyzes innovation through the creation of and experimentation with new
uses”).
38 See Yochai Benkler, From Consumers to Users: Shifting the Deep Structures of
Regulation Towards Sustainable Commons and User Access, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 561,
579 (2000) (promoting commons as more “effective means than traditional structural
media regulation of securing robust democratic discourse and individual expressive
freedom”).
39 See Susan Crawford, The Internet and the Project of Communications Law, 55
UCLA L. REV. 359, 387-90 (2007) (“Our national economic policy . . . should be closely
tied to communications policy that facilitates the interactive, group-forming attributes of
the Internet.”).

Sarah McBride & Phred Dvorak, Studios Strike HD-DVD Deals for Holiday 2005,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 29, 2004, at B1. In this case, Sony’s Blu-ray format eventually
triumphed over the competing HD-DVD format.
See Martin Fackler, Toshiba
Acknowledges Defeat as Blu-ray Wins Format Battle, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2008, at C2.
40

See Mark Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic
Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479, 552 (1998) (“Each of these computer networks was largely
incompatible with the others, with the result that joining a bulletin board allowed you to
communicate only with other members of that bulletin board. Interconnection protocols,
41
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How did the Internet achieve its open, composite structure? The answer is
not obvious. The Internet has no master control element that decides where
information flows.42 Instead, individual routers and networks pass along packets
of data between their origin and destination. Moreover, the Internet is both
global and, in most of the world, a creature of the private sector.43 Though it
traces its roots to American military and government research networks, today’s
commercial Internet is not a government-built system.44 Nor is it a pervasively
regulated network like the public switched telephone network45 or virtually every
other major communications network.46 External mandates cannot explain the
Internet’s universality.
Remarkably, for all the complexity and the rapid changes in their constituent
technologies, the networks and systems that combine to form the Internet do so
largely voluntarily.
The Internet pulls itself together. This behavior ⎯
coordination without a coordinator, competitive advantage without proprietary
dominance ⎯ has enabled many of the Internet’s great achievements. Despite
this, the interconnected Internet faces significant challenges, as the next section
explains.

B. The Network at War with Itself
Although the Internet has held together remarkably well, its composite
architecture creates significant challenges. Deeply rooted tensions become
significant when a network becomes as economically and socially significant as

beginning with Usenet and SMTP, allowed messages to be transferred between different
groups of networked computers.”).
See Kevin Werbach, Digital Tornado: The Internet and Telecommunications
Policy 20 (FCC Office of Plans and Policy, Working Paper No. 29, 1997), available at
http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/OPP/working_papers/oppwp29pdf.html
(describing
governance and management of internet).
42

China is an obvious counter-example to private control of the Internet. See infra
Part II.A.3.
43

See generally KATIE HAFNER & MATTHEW LYON, WHERE WIZARDS STAY UP LATE:
THE ORIGINS OF THE INTERNET (1996) (detailing history of Internet); JOHN NAUGHTON, A
BRIEF HISTORY OF THE FUTURE: THE ORIGINS OF THE INTERNET (1999) (discussing same).
44

The public switched telephone network refers to the global publicly accessible
telephone system. HARRY NEWTON, NEWTON’S TELECOM DICTIONARY 736 (22d ed. 2006).
45

46 The Federal Communications Commission imposes extensive regulatory
obligations on telephone networks, pursuant to the Communications Act. 47 U.S.C. §§
151-615(b) (2000).
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the Internet is today.
Seemingly contradictory tendencies toward both
centralization and decentralization are producing an array of conflicts that
current legal frameworks do not adequately address.47
At one level, the Internet is fundamentally democratizing and decentralizing.
It empowers anyone to launch a new application and allows users to express
themselves freely.48 In business, the Internet allows firms to globalize their
operations and facilitates efficient collaboration among distributed employees,
partners, contractors, and customers.49 In media, the Internet allows creators to
deliver programming through a mesh of peer-to-peer servers,50 rather than a
central archive. Further, the Internet empowers users to exchange content
directly rather than rely on traditional commercial distribution chains.51 In
countless other areas, the Internet sweeps away traditional gatekeepers and
places productive capacity in the hands of individuals.52
Simultaneously, however, the Internet establishes new dominant centers to
replace the old proprietary ones. Google is a high-profile example. In just a few
years, Google has become an online colossus, dominating Internet search and
advertising.53 Google is also threatening large and entrenched traditional media
businesses by capturing viewers these businesses once controlled. Unlike
Microsoft in the operating system market, Google owns no proprietary

47

See infra Part II.

48

See infra Part IV.B.2.

49 See generally JOHN HAGEL & JOHN SEELY BROWN, THE ONLY SUSTAINABLE EDGE:
WHY BUSINESS STRATEGY DEPENDS ON PRODUCTIVE FRICTION AND DYNAMIC SPECIALIZATION
(2005) (describing business potential of pervasive global networks).
50 Peer-to-peer means that computers connect to each other as peers, rather than
through a hierarchical arrangement. See Nelson Minar et al., A Network of Peers: Peerto-Peer Models Through the History of the Internet, in PEER-TO-PEER: HARNESSING THE
POWER OF DISRUPTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 3, 3-4 (Andy Oram ed., 2001).
51 See Yochai Benkler, Freedom in the Commons: Towards a Political Economy of
Information, 52 DUKE L.J. 1245, 1246-47 (2003); Dan Hunter & F. Gregory Lastowka,
Amateur-to-Amateur, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 951, 1003-06 (2004).
52 See YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS:
TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 32 (2006).

HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION

53 See Sarah Arnott, Discontent Flares Over Google’s ‘Dominance,’ THE INDEP., June
16, 2008, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/discontent-flares-overgoogles-dominance-847920.html; Jim Kerstetter, Hitwise Provides More Proof of
Google’s Search Dominance, CNET, Aug. 12, 2008, http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_310015300-93.html.
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gateways.54 Its users are free to choose another search engine, and Google’s
primary function is to send those users away to other sites. Yet Google continues
to increase its revenue, profits, and market share despite the best efforts of
powerful competitors such as Microsoft and Yahoo!.55
Across the board, whether it be YouTube in online video sharing, eBay in
auctions, or Facebook and MySpace in social networking, the leading Internet
players may be new, but they dominate their markets at least as much as WalMart or Intel dominate theirs.56 The world may be flat, to use Thomas
Friedman’s memorable phrase,57 but the Internet is in many ways highly
hierarchical, and increasingly concentrated.58
The hardware and software infrastructure of the Internet is experiencing
similar consolidation. The major players in the Internet economy, including
Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo!, are constructing massive central data centers that
integrate connectivity, applications, and content to deliver increasingly
sophisticated services across the global Internet.59 To meet the fantastic
processing and storage demands of today’s network applications, Internet-based
providers are effectively building virtual supercomputers from thousands of
coordinated machines. Constructing this infrastructure requires both significant
capital and sophisticated expertise in integrating systems. Internet application

54 Because Microsoft owns the Windows operating system, it controls the application
programming interfaces that developers use to build software running on Windows-based
personal computers. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 61-62 (D.C. Cir.
2001) (discussing how Microsoft used its control over Windows to harm competition).
55 Eric Bangeman, 18-month Beatdown: Google Search Crushing Microsoft, Yahoo,
ARS TECHNICA, Aug. 13, 2008, http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20080813-18month-beatdown-google-search-crushing-microsoft-yahoo.html.
56 See, e.g., News Release, The Nielson Company, The “500 Million” Club (July 2,
2008) (http://blog.nielsen.com/nielsenwire/wp-content/uploads/2008/07/report.pdf)
(demonstrating dominance in U.K.).
57 See generally THOMAS FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD IS FLAT: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2005) (explaining how globalization creates a “flat” world with a
level playing field).
58 See Eli Noam, The Internet: Still Wide Open and Competitive?, Paper Presented at
the Telecommunications Policy Research Conference 4 fig.1 (Sept. 2003), available at
http://web.si.umich.edu/tprc/papers/2003/200/noam_TPRC2003.pdf (finding that
“the Internet sector’s overall concentration has never been low”).
59 See generally George Gilder, The Information Factories, WIRED, Oct. 2006,
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/14.10/cloudware_pr.html
(describing
how
Internet creates new centralized “cloud computing” infrastructure in data centers).
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infrastructure is making the same shift that electric power generation did at the
end of the nineteenth century.60 Central utilities are replacing local production.61
The juxtaposition of decentralizing and centralizing forces produces conflicts.
Powerful new centers threaten other participants, even when they don’t explicitly
manipulate the terms of their offerings to cement their dominance. That threat
in turn, encourages those smaller participants to create their own balkanized
enclaves. The very success of the network of networks produces the seeds of its
failure.62 This basic storyline describes a diverse set of major business, legal, and
political developments across all segments of the Internet economy. Part II
examines four of these fault lines in detail.

II. THE PATH TO BALKANIZATION
For most of its commercial history, the Internet exerted a powerful
centripetal force.63 The Internet pulled networks together into peering and
transit relationships,64 linked hundreds of millions of devices into common
address spaces, established universal application platforms divorced from the

60 See NICHOLAS CARR, THE BIG SWITCH: REWIRING THE WORLD, FROM EDISON TO
GOOGLE 12 (2008).
61 In the 19th century, companies operated their own local electricity generation
facilities, typically powered by water wheels. Large centralized power plants replaced
these local facilities because they were much more efficient. The Internet equivalent is
the shift from individual service or content providers maintaining their own server
computers to a “cloud computing” model in which massive central data centers provide
shared capacity for many providers. See id. at 9-11.

This story is not unique to the Internet. The tendency of networks to promote both
centralization and decentralization of power and wealth has been observed in other
contexts, most notably the sociology of urbanization and globalization. See Ithiel de sola
Pool, Communications Technology and Land Use, 451 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI.
1, 2 (1980); Saskia Sassen, Locating Cities on Global Circuits, 14 ENV’T & URBANIZATION
13, 15 (2002) (describing “dynamic of simultaneous geographic dispersal and
concentration”); Kazys Varnelis, The Centripetal City:
Telecommunications, the
Internet, and the Shaping of the Modern Urban Environment, CABINET MAG., Spring
2004, available at http://varnelis.net/articles/centripetal_city (explaining how Internet
produces both centralization and decentralization in urban environment).
62

See infra Part IV.A. Because the Internet is a network of networks, it is both the
origin and the subject of these forces.
63

See Michael Kende, The Digital Handshake: Connecting Internet Backbones, 11
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 45, 45 (2003).
64
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infrastructure underneath, and brought content into accessible pools.65 This
pressure for uniform connectivity, however, also sowed the seeds of a
countervailing reaction.
At every layer of network functionality, the ties that have traditionally bound
the Internet into a universal, richly connected whole are weakening.66 This Part
analyzes four major developments: private address and governance spaces,
peering archipelagos, proprietary application-integrated broadband networks,
and islands of protected content.67 While each of these trends has received some
attention, the pattern behind them has not. Each phenomenon involves a
different set of players and a different aspect of the Internet. Some appear arcane
and technical, while others seem like typical conflicts between competing
companies. The connection, however, is clear. From the physical infrastructure
that delivers data across the globe to the content-based services that drive
advertising and transactions, the Internet is becoming a less uniform, less
universal place.

A. Internet Governance: Operational Balkanization
The clearest example of creeping Internet fragmentation involves the area
broadly described as governance — the policies and practices that knit the global
internetwork together. The Internet famously has no central government.68 Also,
because the Internet operates across national boundaries, sovereign nations have
difficulty subjecting it to their mandates. The governance of the Internet, in
practice, involves the arrangements through which systems and sites join the
network, as well as the policies that individual governments impose on Internet

65

See infra Part II.A-D.

The Internet is a layered system, with separable levels of functionality sitting on top
of one another. See Kevin Werbach, A Layered Model for Internet Policy, 1 J. ON
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 37, 57-64 (2002) (describing four vertical layers of internet
as physical, logical, applications, and content). See generally Kevin Werbach, Breaking
the Ice: Rethinking Telecommunications Law for the Digital Age, 4 J. ON TELECOMM. &
HIGH TECH. L. 59 (2005) (expanding on layered model) [hereinafter Werbach, Breaking
the Ice].
66

67

See infra Part II.A-D.

68 “We reject: kings, presidents and voting. We believe in: rough consensus and
running code.” David D. Clark, An Input/Output Architecture for Virtual Memory
Computer Systems (Jan. 1, 1974) (Ph.D. dissertation), reprinted in M.I.T. Project MAC
Technical
Report
117,
at
(1974),
available
at
http://publications.csail.mit.edu/lcs/pubs/pdf/MIT-LCS-TR-117.pdf.
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providers operating within their jurisdiction.69 In both areas, governments are
attempting to carve out fiefdoms in which proprietary rules apply.
This process has been underway for some time.70 The current developments
however, are different than the traditional governmental efforts to regulate
Internet activity that affects their citizens or occurs within their borders. The
changes to Internet governance mechanisms involve technical alterations to the
Internet itself. When an Internet user in France and a Web-based services
provider headquartered in California are forced to comply with French law, they
may be prohibited from entering into a transaction, such as sale of Nazi
memorabilia, that other Internet participants would be free to conduct.71 Yet they
are still connecting to the same Internet, and benefiting from its universality.
Thus, there will not be a single Internet if the structure of Internet addressing
and governance changes.
The major examples of Internet governance balkanization are fragmentation
of the address space and governmental efforts to impose localized legal rules.
This section first describes, in Subpart 1, how Internet addressing operates.
Subpart 2 then describes the potential breakdown of a unitary address space,
principally due to battles over international character sets. Subpart 3 details
China’s efforts to dominate the future Internet through control over the nextgeneration Internet addressing protocol. Finally, Subpart 4 explains how
governments are imposing local content rules and other restrictions that further
fragment the Internet.
1. Internet Addressing
The most active battlefield of Internet governance is the domain name system
(“DNS”). The DNS is the crucial link between the machine-readable addresses of
Internet-connected network nodes and their human-readable identities.72 For
example, a domain name such as “ebay.com” means nothing to the routers that

69

See GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 31, at 37-40.

70

See id.

71

See id. at 1-2.

See generally ELLEN RONY & PETER RONY, THE DOMAIN NAME HANDBOOK (1998)
(providing comprehensive and practical history of policies, protocols, principles,
controversies, and initiatives with DNS); Jon Postel, Network Working Group, RFC 1591:
Domain Name System Structure and Delegation (Mar. 1994), ftp://ftp.isi.edu/innotes/rfc1591.txt (providing information on structure of names in DNS and on
administration of domains).
72
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direct Internet traffic but everything to the users looking for the auction site.73 In
addition to this operational function, the DNS plays a key role in integrating the
Internet. The universal DNS database, with generic top-level domain names74
independent of physical geography, helps to bind the World Wide Web into a
single global platform.75
The DNS is a distributed addressing database.76 When a user sends a request
for an Internet address, such as a web page query or an email message to a
destination, that user’s Internet service provider (“ISP”) queries its domain name
server for the Internet Protocol (“IP”) address associated with that name. The
ISP’s local domain name server pulls content regularly from one of thirteen
global “root servers.” So long as all ISPs point to the canonical root servers, every
domain name represents a unique point on the Internet.77 However, an ISP could
choose to point to a different DNS directory. If an ISP did so, its users might go
to an entirely different website when they typed an address such as
Whitehouse.gov or AOL.com.78 Users would have no way of knowing because the
redirection would be seamless. Thus, what holds the logical layer of the Internet
together is the voluntary agreement of ISPs to point to the same root servers.
The Internet grew out of the NSFNet, managed by the U.S. National Science
Foundation (“NSF”). The DNS infrastructure in turn was established under an
NSF contract.79 Network Solutions Inc. (“NSI”), a small networking company,

73

For a description of how the DNS functions, see infra note 76 and accompanying

text.
A generic top-level domain name (gTLD), such as .com, .biz, or .museum, has no
necessary connection to a physical location. By contrast, a country-code domain name,
such as .uk or .jp, is associated with a sovereign nation. The most significant gTLDs are
.com, .net, and .org. See Postel, supra note 72, at 1-3.
74

See Christopher Rhoads, Endangered Domain, WALL ST. J., Jan. 19, 2006, at A1
(explaining how domain name system holds Internet together, and identifying various
balkanization threats).
75

Paul Vixie, DNS Complexity, ACM QUEUE, Apr. 2007, at 24, available at
http://www.acmqueue.com/modules.php?name=Content&pa=showpage&pid=481&page
=1 (calling DNS “a distributed, coherent, reliable, autonomous, hierarchical database, the
first and only one of its kind”).
76

77

See id.

78

See RONY & RONY, supra note 72, at 64-75.

79 See Jay P. Kesan & Rajiv C. Shah, Fool Us Once Shame on You — Fool Us Twice
Shame on Us: What We Can Learn From the Privatizations of the Internet Backbone
Network and the Domain Name System, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 89, 170-71 (2001).
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won the original contract to build and maintain the DNS registry.80 In the mid1990s, the NSF allowed NSI to begin charging for domain name registrations,
migrating the system to a privately funded enterprise.81 An explosion of
registrations generated capital that allowed for massive expansion of the capacity
of the DNS. However, private control of this increasingly important resource was
tantamount to a government-granted monopoly at the center of the Internet
infrastructure.82 Meanwhile, pressure grew for the addition of new generic toplevel domain names, such as .com, and conflicts over the intersection of domain
names and trademarks escalated.
Subsequently, in 1998 the U.S. government helped create the Internet
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (“ICANN”) as the administrative
and policy overseer for the DNS.83 At the same time, the U.S. Department of
Commerce negotiated a new arrangement with NSI to allow competition in
domain name registration.84 ICANN is a unique, quasi-private entity. Formally
constituted as a California non-profit corporation, it actually operates as a global
governance entity with a Byzantine structure that incorporates representation
from various private, non-governmental, and governmental entities.85
During the reformation of DNS management in the mid-1990s, there were
serious efforts to set up alternative roots.86 Even Jon Postel, the engineer who
80
See
Network
Solutions,
Company
History,
networksolutions.com/corporate-history.php (last visited Nov. 12, 2008).
81
See Answers.com, Network Solutions,
topic/network-solutions (last visited Nov. 12, 2008).

LLC,

http://about-

http://www.answers.com/

82 NSI was eventually acquired by SAIC, a large defense contractor, and subsequently
by Verisign. See David Diamond, Whose Internet is it Anyway?, WIRED, Apr. 1998, at
172; SAIC, Growth of the Company: FY 2000, http://www.saic.com/about/timeline/
2000.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2008).
83 See MILTON MUELLER, RULING THE ROOT: INTERNET GOVERNANCE AND THE TAMING
CYBERSPACE 163 (2002); A. Michael Froomkin, Wrong Turn in Cyberspace: Using
ICANN to Route Around the APA and the Constitution, 50 DUKE L.J. 17, 24 (2000); Kesan
& Shah, supra note 79, at 174; Jonathan Weinberg, ICANN and the Problem of
Legitimacy, 50 DUKE L.J. 187, 209-12 (2000).

OF

See Department of Commerce & Network Solutions, Inc., Amendment No. 11 to
NCR-09218742, http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/proposals/
84

docnsi100698.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2008).
85

See Froomkin, supra note 83, at 71.

An alternative root is a parallel root server that an Internet access provider can use
instead of the official root system to determine the Internet protocol address associated
with a domain name. See Will A. Foster et al., Who Governs the Internet?, COMM. ACM,
Aug. 1997, at 15, 19, (discussing concerns about efforts to create “an alternate set of root86
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historically oversaw DNS policy, engaged in a “technical experiment” to redirect
the root servers, apparently to show that he could.87 The creation of ICANN and
its arrangements with NSI and other root server operators ended these efforts at
the time. There are new scenarios on the horizon, however, under which the
unity of the DNS may crumble.
2. Address fragmentation
One threat to the DNS lies in private address spaces. The DNS is the
addressing system for the dominant applications at the dawn of the commercial
Internet: email, file transfers, and the Web. All of these key off of domain
names. Many newer applications, however, use their own addresses. The largest
instant messaging (IM) networks have over 100 million users, reachable through
names the IM operator assigns privately.88 Skype’s voice over Internet protocol
(VOIP) service also has over 100 million users.89 Similarly, social networking
services such as MySpace, Hi5, and Facebook have massive user bases.90 These
services’ users are not reachable through their universal email address; rather,
the sender must know their private address on the service.
Private addresses are nothing new. IM services have been around since the
mid-1990s.91 What has changed is the prevalence of these applications and their
growing share of Internet usage. This is especially true for younger Internet
level domain name servers”); Weinberg, supra note 83, at 198; Jonathan Zittrain,
ICANN: Between the Public and the Private — Comments Before Congress, 14 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1071 n.58 (1999); Open Root Server Confederation, http://www.open-rsc.org/
(last visited Oct. 31, 2008); Rogue Domains Revolt, CNET NEWS.COM, Mar. 4, 1997,
http://news.com.com/2100-1023-275957.html?tag=rn.
87

See Froomkin, supra note 83, at 46.

88

See Werbach, Breaking the Ice, supra note 66, at 88.

Edward Cone, Harnessing the Power of Networks, CIO INSIGHT, Aug. 1, 2008,
available
at
http://www.cioinsight.com/c/a/Books/Harnessing-the-Power-ofNetworks/.
89

A social networking service provides information and applications based around a
“social graph” — a map of relationships between friends or business associates. See
Social Networking Increases Across Globe, Facebook Tops Popularity Chart,
TECHSHOUT, Aug. 13, 2008, http://www.techshout.com/internet/2008/13/socialnetworking-increases-across-globe-facebook-tops-popularity-chart/.
90

91 The FCC discussed the history and significance of instant messaging in its order
reviewing the merger of AOL and Time-Warner. See In Re Applications for Consent to
the Transfer of Control of Licenses and Section 214 Authorizations by Time Warner Inc.
and America Online, Inc., Transferors, to AOL Time Warner, Inc., Transferee, 16 F.C.C.R.
6547, 6603 paras. 128-45 (mem. op. & order).
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users. There is no sinister plot here. Application providers are making a
voluntary decision to create their own addressing schemes, and users are making
voluntary choices to adopt those applications. Yet the end result is a movement
toward fragmentation of the Internet.
Another, and perhaps more direct, possibility for fragmentation in Internet
addressing arises from language. At one level, the language of the Internet is the
language of its users. When Americans and other English speakers dominated
Internet and World Wide Web usage, most of the content online was in English.
Today, when Europeans and Asians significantly outnumber Americans online,
content in other languages is an increasingly larger share of the total.92 English
however, is built into the DNS because the DNS grew out of an American system.
As evidence that the DNS grew out of an American system, generic top-level
domain names, for example, are shortened versions of English words: for
example, .com for commercial, .org for organization, and .net for network. More
significantly, the character set used for Internet addresses is ASCII, a standard
designed for English and other languages based on the Roman alphabet.93 An
address in Arabic or Russian, to say nothing of idiographic languages such as
Mandarin and Japanese, must be transliterated into ASCII.94 An Internet user
speaking one of these languages cannot simply type in or read a website address
as an English or French speaker can because they use a different character set
than the network.
The way to overcome this limitation is to adopt mechanisms in the DNS that
accept Unicode, a broader standard than ASCII, which can support the world’s
main languages.95 Unfortunately, implementation of such internationalized
domain names (“IDNs”) is not simple, and there are several different options for
doing so. For example, IDNs must co-exist with the existing ASCII domain
names. This means that some ASCII names that overlap with common Unicode

92 See Future of Non-English Internet, DIGITAL LEARNING MAG., Feb., 2008, at 33,
available at http://www.digitallearning.in/articles/article-details.asp?articleid=1718&typ
=THE%20FOYER.
93 ASCII has more characters than English, but many fewer than would be necessary
for all the world’s major languages. Geoff Huston, Internationalizing the Internet, ISP
COLUMN, Dec. 2006, http://www.potaroo.net/ispcol/ 2006-12/idn.html.
94 Hence, for example, one of the largest free web-based email services in China is
163.net, because 163 can be transliterated into “free” in Mandarin. <CITE>

See THE UNICODE CONSORTIUM, THE UNICODE STANDARD: WORLDWIDE CHARACTER
ENCODING, VERSION 1.0, at 1 (1991).
95
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strings96 in some languages will take users to unexpected places. A Korean
speaker might see one site after typing in a domain name, while a German
speaker would see an entirely different site after typing in the Roman character
equivalent of the same domain name. Effectively this would mean that different
languages would create their own parallel domain name systems.97 There might
still be a single governance regime, but to users the result would be identical to a
situation in which each character set had its own parallel root servers.
ICANN has been working to implement IDNs for several years. However,
progress towards an agreement has been slow, dissatisfying representatives of
many countries.98 Ineffective implementation of ICANN-approved IDNs could
have significant negative consequences for the Internet, and could actually lead
to the balkanization that the changes are supposed to avert. In particular,
countries could adopt their own IDNs without waiting for ICANN.99 When the
governments pressured ICANN to implement IDNs quickly, ICANN chair Paul
Twomey expressed concern: “The Internet is like a fifteen story building, and
with international domain names what we’re trying to do is change the bricks in
the basement . . . . [W]e have to make sure that if we change the system, the rest
is all going to work.”100

96

A string is an arbitrary series of characters.

97 See Geoff Huston, Addressing the Future of the Internet, ISP COLUMN, Feb. 2007,
http://www.potaroo.net/ispcol/2007-02/address-paper.html; Huston, supra note 93.
98 Michael Geist, China and the Break-Up of the Net, BBC NEWS.COM, Mar. 7, 2006,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/4779660.stm.
99 See Carolyn Duffy Marsan, Native Language Domains Threaten ’Net, NETWORK
WORLD, Mar. 27, 2006, http://www.networkworld.com/news/2006/032706-icanninternationalized-domain-names.html (“The issue of IDNs threatens to undermine the
Internet itself, which is based on a shared namespace that originates in a single root.”);
Dugie Standeford, ICANN Urged to Speed Up IDNs to Prevent Dangerous “Breakaway”
TLDs, WASH. INTERNET DAILY, Mar. 29, 2006.. There have also been efforts to use
alternate private naming systems on top of the DNS. See Leslie Walker, Web Shortcuts
Become Key Issue, WASH. POST, Apr. 20, 2000, at E1; James Niccolai, Dutch Company
Starts
New
Internet
Address
System,
INFOWORLD,
Nov.
28,
2005,
http://www.infoworld.com/archives/emailPrint.jsp?R=printThis&A=/article/05/11/28/
HNnewaddresssystem_1.html.
100 Asher Moses, Web Chief Warns of Domain Name Chaos, SYDNEY MORNING
HERALD, Nov. 21, 2006, http://www.smh.com.au/news/web/web-chief-warns-ofdomain-name-chaos/2006/11/21/1163871392720.html.

{Page 17}

The Centripetal Network

Kevin Werbach

A 2006 report that China was creating its own parallel root system proved to
be a misunderstanding.101 The report however, could easily have been accurate.
ICANN began implementing IDNs in early 2008 even though open policy
questions persisted.102 Operators of some top-level domains are not waiting.
Neustar, the ICANN-approved registry for the .biz generic top-level domain
name, launched IDNs in March 2007.103 Although such initiatives do not
necessarily conflict with ICANN’s efforts, they raise the possibility of different
portions of the DNS having different internationalization patterns. Multiple
inconsistent implementations of IDNs could turn into a form of fragmentation, or
at least segmentation, of the Net.
Alphanumeric domain names are not the only Internet addresses at risk of
fragmentation. A similar threat is arising around IP numbers, the unique
numeric addresses that routers use to identify each machine connected to the
Internet.
3. China’s IPv6 strategy
When the current version of the Internet protocol, IPv4, was defined in 1979,
the Internet was still a noncommercial network for a relatively small number of
research and government computers.104 The Internet’s protocol designers
adopted a 32-bit address space, allowing for roughly four billion unique network
hosts. At the time, that seemed like a nearly inexhaustible number.105
As the Internet grew, however, the address space gradually became
congested. Because addresses are hierarchical and assigned in blocks to

See BR Staff Writer, China Splits from the Internet? Probably Not, COMPUTER
BUS. REV., Mar. 1, 2006, http://www.cbronline.com/comment/china_splits_from_the_
internet_probably_not.
101

See Press Release, Internet Corp. for Assigned Names and Numbers, IDN TLD
Allocation Implementation Processes (Aug. 20, 2008) (http://www.icann.org/en/
announcements/announcement-20aug08-en.htm); Larry Seltzer, The Era of Whatever,
EWEEK.COM, June 26, 2008, http://www.eweek.com/c/a/Security/The-Era-ofWhatever/.
102

See Press Release, NeuStar, Inc., NeuStar Launches Chinese and Japanese
Language Domain Names in .BIZ TLD (Mar. 22, 2007) (http://phx.corporateir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=189420&p=irol-newsArticle_print&ID=977185&highlight=).
103

See Information Sciences Institute, Internet
http://www.networksorcery.com/enp/ien/ien111.txt.
104

105

See id.
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networks, not every available address is available for use.106 Massive blocks of
addresses were assigned early on to networks and organizations that did not
actually need them. Moreover, the Internet no longer just connected personal
computers, but also incorporated mobile phones, sensors, and other devices.107
Growing Internet adoption has accelerated the time horizon before all available
IPv4 addresses are distributed. Although various measures have been taken to
reduce the usage of IP addresses, current estimates are that IPv4 addresses will
be exhausted in 2011 or 2012.108
The Internet Engineering Task Force (“IETF”), which defines Internet
standards, responded to the impending addressing shortage, and to other
limitations in IPv4 such as security, by developing a new protocol, IPv6.109 IPv6
was adopted in 1995 as the official replacement for IPv4.110 IPv6 provides 128-bit
address space, enough for more than 1038 unique hosts — more than the total
number of atoms on the surface of the planet.111
Despite the advantages of IPv6, adoption over the past decade has been
spotty. The costs of updating every network-connected device are substantial.112
Companies and network operators see no revenue gains associated with these
costs because from the outside the network operates the same as it did before.
Furthermore, the IETF has no authority to mandate protocol adoption.

See William Jackson, Government Moves to IPv6 One Step at a Time, GOV’T
COMPUTER NEWS, Dec. 11, 2000, http://www.gcn.com/print/vol19_no34/3391-1.html
(stating that IPv4 address allocation is only five percent efficient).
106

See Kevin Werbach, Sensors and Sensibilities, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2321, 2324
(2007).
107

108 See Dugie Standeford, Enhanced Cooperation in Key Policy Areas Said to Show
ICANN Works, WASH. INTERNET DAILY, July 2, 2007, at <PIN> (quoting ICANN
Chairman Vint Cerf’s estimate of IPv4 exhaustion date); Neal Weinberg, D-Day Is
Coming
Up
Fast,
NETWORK
WORLD,
June
28,
2007,
http://www.networkworld.com/news/2007/062807-ipv6-deadline.html (stating ARIN
head John Curran’s estimate of 2011 exhaustion date).

S. Deering et al., Network Working Group, Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6)
Specification (Dec. 1998), http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2460.txt; IPv6:
The Next
Generation!, Information Page, http://www.ipv6.org/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2008).
109

Ben Worthen, Internet Strategy: China’s Next Generation Internet, CIO MAG.,
July 15, 2006, www.cio.com/article/22985.
110

Kevin Murphy, Internet Addresses Drying Up Fast, COMPUTERWIRE, May 22,
2007, www.computerwire.com/industries/research/?pid=8508BA51-4FCC-47E9-AEE7FAAFF18AC8F1.
111

112

See Weinberg, supra note 108.
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Assuming a private group or regulator could somehow require a transition and
shut off IPv4-based equipment, such a step would produce massive disruption
and outcry. So, while software and hardware sold today almost universally
supports IPv6 as an option, few major networks are fully updated to IPv6.113 As a
result, IPv4 address exhaustion is a real possibility.114
The shortage of IPv4 addresses is felt most acutely in China, which had
negligible Internet usage a decade ago, but is experiencing massive growth in
connectivity. More than a quarter of all worldwide IPv4 addresses are assigned
in the United States even though it represents a significantly smaller share of the
global Internet user base.115 In fact, even though China now has as many Internet
users as the United States, it controls only about sixty million IP addresses, the
same as Stanford University.116
China’s national government seized on the Internet as an important priority
for technological leadership in the twenty-first century. As a result, China has
been aggressively funding development of the Chinese Internet industry. China
has made IPv6 deployment a centerpiece of this national Internet policy.117 It is

113 For example, both Microsoft and Apple’s current operating systems natively
support IPv6.
114 See Ben Arnoldy, For Online Users, a Looming Shortage of IP Addresses,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 3, 2007, http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0803/p02s01ussc.html?page=2; IPv4 Address Report, http://www.potaroo.net/tools/ipv4/index.html
(last visited Nov. 12, 2008). ARIN, which assigns IP addresses for North America, felt the
need to issue its August 1 statement to express its opposition to efforts that have already
begun to create a secondary market for increasingly scarce IPv4 addresses. Statement of
ARIN’s Board of Trustees Regarding Future Internet Address Policy in the ARIN Region 1
(Aug. 1, 2007) (http://www.arin.net/media/200701August_Statement.pdf); see also
Posting of John Curran to NANOG Mailing List, http://www.merit.edu/mail.
archives/nanog/msg01712.html (July 24, 2007) (“Continuation of the ISP industry is
predicated on enabling IPv6 for public-facing sites over the next few years.”). See
generally Raymond A. Plzak & Stephen M. Ryan, Legal and Policy Aspects of Internet
Number Resources, Presented to VI Computer Law World Conference (Sept. 6, 2006),
http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/ahrc/complaw/docs/ARIN.pdf (explaining “the need for a
consistent legal and public policy approach to critical management issues regarding
‘internet number resources,’ which include Internet Protocol (“IP”) addresses”).
115 See NO. RESOURCE ORG., INTERNET NUMBER RESOURCE REPORT, http://www.nro.
net/documents/presentations/jointstats.v1.0608.pdf (citing to IPv4 Global Unicast
Address Assignments, http://www.iana.org/assignments/ipv4-address-space/) (last
visited Nov. 12, 2008).
116

See Worthen, supra note 110.

See David Kirkpatrick, Experts Say U.S. Must Act on Internet, FORTUNE, Nov. 6,
2006, available at http://money.cnn.com/2006/11/03/technology/fastforward_ipv6
_networking.fortune; Robert Cringely, The $200 Billion Lunch: We’re Switching to
117
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building China’s Next Generation Internet, an all-IPv6 high-speed Internet
platform.118 The Chinese government has already invested $200 million directly
in the effort, supplemented with indirect expenditures by telecommunications
companies and research organizations.119
By allowing every network-connected device to have its own address, IPv6
could facilitate a new generation of Internet-based applications, especially those
involving smart devices beyond the personal computer. China also linked IPv6
deployment to its hosting of the 2008 Olympic Games.120 China is betting that,
by leading the world in IPv6 deployment, it will gain a head start on development
of the new applications and services that take advantage of IPv6. China believes
this process will be analogous to the way the United States had a significant head
start in building the applications that define today’s Internet.121
IPv6 itself is a non-proprietary standard issued by the IETF.122 However,
there would be many opportunities for a country that dominated implementation
of IPv6 to dictate standards and practical implementation of services. Companies
will build products to meet market demand. If the Chinese implementation of
IPv6 represents the biggest market, vendors will make equipment to support it.
The world got a taste of what this scenario could look like with the
development of new mobile phone standards when China developed its own
proprietary protocol, called TD-SCDMA.123 Vendors had to decide whether to
develop products to the proprietary Chinese standard, even though it may not
have been efficient to do so. A 2006 survey of 1,000 Internet experts by network
equipment manufacturer Juniper Networks found that eighty-six percent of
respondents worried that slow adoption of IPv6 would hurt U.S.

IPv6, Dontcha Know, and It Might Be Worth It, THE PULPIT, Nov. 2, 2006,
http://www.pbs.org/cringely/pulpit/2006/pulpit_20061102_001174.html.
118

See Worthen, supra note 110.

119

See id.

120

See id.

121

See id.

122

See sources cited supra note 109.

123 TD-SCDMA stands for time division synchronous code division multiple access. It
is a variant of the code division multiple access (CDMA) technologies in other thirdgeneration wireless standards. See Frederick Yeung, Beijing Has Much at Stake on 3G
Plan, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, Jan. 7, 2008, at 5.
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competitiveness.124 More worrisome, fifty-eight percent thought it could imperil
the stability of the Internet in the United States.125
Damage to U.S. competitiveness is only one dimension of the threat from
aggressive Chinese implementation of IPv6. A world in which some countries
build on IPv6, while others continue to maintain IPv4 networks, is one in which
the address space of the Net is no longer universal. Management issues across
the boundaries of these two blocks may become more complex, especially if they
divide along geopolitical boundaries. Investment in enhancements on one
platform may not redound to the full benefit of the other if those enhancements
either depend on or work around the local addressing environment.
As significant as these technical and market challenges are, they are not the
only danger of Internet fragmentation arising from the addressing system.
Control over Internet addressing is also a political question.
4. The politics of balkanization
The DNS and its associated components are the closest things the Internet
has to central control points. Shut down any website, or even any Internet
backbone network, and while there might be significant disruption, the Internet
as we know it would continue to function.126 Shut down the DNS root servers,
and the Internet would effectively go dark.127 Moreover, the DNS is also the
mechanism by which individuals, organizations, and networks take concrete,
public steps to join the Internet. A user can connect to the Internet simply by
opening a private account with any access provider. However, a website seeking
to become publicly accessible must register its domain name somewhere so that
it goes into the central registry and root servers.128 The DNS therefore is the
logical place to locate any regulatory or contractual obligations on Internet sites.

124 See Press Release, Juniper Networks, IPv6 Transition Will Impact 30 Percent of
U.S. Government IT Purchasing Decisions in 2007 According to IPv6 Government Action
Study (Nov. 6, 2006) (http://www.juniper.net/company/presscenter/pr/2006/pr061106.html).
125

See id.

126 Because each Internet router independently forwards packets along the best route
to its destination, traffic is automatically routed along new paths when one network fails.

More precisely, there would be no updates, since ISPs would still have the static
links in their cached copies of DNS.
127

128

See MUELLER, supra note 83, at 5-7.
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Many governments chafe at what they perceive to be the excessive level of
U.S. dominance of the Internet. Their concerns include dissatisfaction with
ICANN, a belief that Internet governance issues should be addressed through an
established international organization such as the United Nations, and the desire
of developing countries to address the global digital divide.129
These concerns coalesced in an U.N. effort called the World Summit on
Information Society (“WSIS”).130 In 2003 and 2005, WSIS held two meetings to
address key issues of global Internet governance. Throughout the process, the
United States, while endorsing the broad concept of the meeting, strongly
resisted pressure to turn over ICANN’s governance function to an international
body. After a great deal of debate, representatives at the second WSIS meeting
agreed to create a new group to carry forward its work — the Internet Governance
Forum (“IGF”).131 At the time, U.S. representatives expressed satisfaction that
the IGF was a discussion forum rather than an agency with any power to adopt
rules, and would not supersede the existing authority vested in ICANN.132
It remains to be seen whether the IGF will satisfy both the forces for and
against an intergovernmental Internet governance mechanism. If the IGF fails,
countries may simply go their own way, balkanizing the Internet.133 Such
balkanization would not necessarily involve a series of completely parallel
networks. Recall that the DNS functions through the voluntary decisions of ISPs
to point to the canonical root servers. If operators in some countries chose to
point to non-ICANN root servers, these databases may be almost completely
identical to the current ones, at least initially. Users would therefore not see
anything different until the breakaway network began to adopt different DNS

129 See Joan Engebretson, Rooted in Controversy, TELEPHONY, Nov. 20, 2006, at 28,
31,
available
at
http://telephonyonline.com/mag/telecom_rooted_controversy/
index.html; Jonathan Krim, U.S. May Face World at Internet Governance Summit,
WASH. POST, Oct. 13, 2005, at D05; Frederick Kempe, How the Web Was Run, WALL ST.
J. ONLINE, Oct. 25, 2005, available at http://www.wgig.org/news/Thinking%20Global
.pdf. The issues didn’t involve the war, but the climate made more desire for
international solutions.
130 See World Summit on the Information Society, Basic Information: About WSIS,
http://www.itu.int/wsis/basic/about.html (last visited Aug. 18, 2008).

See
Internet
Governance
Forum,
About
This
http://www.intgovforum.org/about.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2008).
131

Web

Site,

See Declan McCullagh, US Endorses Internet Governance Forum, ZDNET, Nov.
16, 2005, http://news.zdnet.co.uk/internet/0,1000000097,39237279,00.htm.
132

See Darren Waters, Warning Over “Broken Up” Internet, BBC NEWS, Oct. 12,
2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/6037345.stm.
133
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mappings. Recently, a group based in Germany, calling itself the Open Root
Server Network, established its own parallel root system to protest the U.S.
invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan.134 Though largely symbolic, this effort shows
how simple it would be to split the Internet. If the concerns that gave rise to the
WSIS meeting are not resolved in the coming years, there may be more serious
efforts, backed by governments from around the globe, to set up a parallel root
system.
Already, those countries wishing to control what Internet content their
citizens can access, most notably China, are taking matters into their own hands
and creating a semi-balkanized Internet. China has created a ring of gateways at
the points where Internet backbones pass into the country, deploying filtering
servers that block or redirect certain content deemed politically or otherwise
inappropriate. This “Great Firewall of China” can be circumvented by clever
technical mechanisms, but the average Chinese Web user sees what the
government deems appropriate.135
China is the most prominent, but by no means the only, country adopting
pervasive Internet censorship. In fact, Internet censorship is proliferating
around the world.136 Governments seeking fine-grained controls on what speech
passes across the network may find common ground with network operators
seeking fine-grained control over applications and content as a way of enhancing
revenues. These governments may also make common cause with individuals
seeking to exclude malware and what they perceive to be inappropriate.137

134

See Foroohar, supra note 1, at 39.

See Lawrence Lessig & Paul Resnick, Zoning Speech On The Internet: A Legal and
Technical Model, 98 MICH. L. REV. 395, 396 (1999); Christopher Stevenson, Note,
Breaching the Great Firewall: China’s Internet Censorship and the Quest for Freedom
of Expression in a Connected World, 30 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 531, 556-57 (2007);
Germie Barme & Sang Ye, The Great Firewall of China, WIRED, June 1997, at 176.
135

See Mark Anderson, A Sneak Peek at a Fractured Web, WIRED NEWS, Nov. 13,
2006, http://www.wired.com/science/discoveries/news/2006/11/72104. See generally
ACCESS DENIED: THE PRACTICE AND POLICY OF GLOBAL INTERNET FILTERING 155-432
(Ronald Deibert et al. eds., 2007) (analyzing Internet filtering practices in over three
dozen countries); Nart Villeneuve, The Filtering Matrix: Integrated Mechanisms of
Information Control and the Demarcation of Borders in Cyberspace, FIRST MONDAY,
May
1996,
at
http://firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/1307/1227
(“Increasingly, states are adopting practices aimed at regulating and controlling the
Internet as it passes through their borders.”)(Last visited Nov. 19, 2008).
136

137 See John G. Palfrey, Jr. & Robert Rogoyski, The Move to the Middle:
The
Enduring Threat of “Harmful” Speech to Network Neutrality, 21 WASH U. J.L. & POL’Y 31,
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As a legal matter, governments are entitled to determine what Internet
content their citizens can access, just as they can determine what books they read
or what television shows they can view.138 The thorny disputes over Internet
jurisdiction involve situations where one country seeks to apply its laws to
individuals or companies located somewhere else.139 There is no question today
that governments have the technical wherewithal to, at a minimum, make it
significantly more difficult for their citizens to access information on the
Internet.140 The danger lies in Internet content controls becoming not just local
actions on the part of individual governments, but challenges to the structure and
universality of the Internet itself. Those challenges are even more apparent in the
next area of potential fragmentation: the physical infrastructure that carries
network traffic.

B. Network Infrastructure: Service Balkanization
The physical networks that deliver Internet data across the world are also
susceptible to balkanization. These “backbone” networks were the initial
adopters of the interconnectivity that produced the composite Internet.141 In fact,
the primary function of the Internet protocol is to enable independent data
networks to federate into a single meta-network. Today, however, the primary
considerations for the Internet’s constituent networks are not technical, but
economic. The business relationships between Internet backbone networks
determine the basic connectivity patterns of the network. As with addressing and
governance, fragmentation is beginning to replace universality. Subpart 1 of this
section explains how Internet backbone interconnection operates, and Subpart 2
explains how the system that allowed for relatively seamless connectivity is
breaking down.

42-53 (2006); Jonathan L. Zittrain, The Generative Internet, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1974,
2013 (2006).
138

This is not a judgment that censorship is good. It most certainly is not. But it

exists.
See GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 31, at 143-45; Joel R. Reidenberg, Technology
and Internet Jurisdiction, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1951, 1953 (2005).
139

140

See GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 31, at 66-85.

141 An Internet service provider (ISP) or Internet access provider, such as Earthlink or
Time Warner Cable, offers service directly to an end-user or company. A backbone
provider, such as Level 3 Communications, offers service between ISPs. Some companies
such as Verizon and AT&T provide both functions. See Werbach, supra note 42, at 13.
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1. Terms of network interconnection
Until the early 1990s, there was only one Internet backbone — the NSFNet,
operated by the National Science Foundation.142 Regional educational and
governmental networks connected through this backbone to hand off traffic.
When the NSF decided to exit from the business of managing the Internet, it did
not simply privatize the central NSFNet. Instead, the NSF decreed that, at the
same time the Internet was commercialized, the backbone would become
competitive.143 To this aim, the NSF funded the creation of Network Access
Points (NAPs) for exchange of traffic and required the privatized NSFNet
backbone to connect to them.144 At these neutral, multi-lateral exchange points,
new backbones could interconnect to exchange traffic without restriction.
Within a few years, the NAPs became congested and diminished in
significance relative to a new set of private inter-backbone relationships and
third-party interconnection mechanisms.145
The contractual relationships
between backbones took two primary forms: peering and transit.146 In a peering
relationship, the networks exchange traffic without any financial settlement. The
assumption is that the networks gain roughly equal benefits from the
relationship, and therefore metering and billing for traffic passing in each
direction merely adds complexity and transaction costs to the relationship.147
Conversely, in a transit relationship, one network pays the other for the service of
delivering packets.148
The Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) has never attempted to
regulate the financial relationships between the networks that make up the
Internet.149 Thus, there is no standard rule for which inter-network relationships
are subject to peering and which to transit. Nor is there any standard definition

142

See id.

143 See Brett M. Frischmann, Privatization and Commercialization of the Internet
Infrastructure: Rethinking Market Intervention into Government and Government
Intervention into the Market, 2 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 19-24 (2001); Kesan &
Shaw, supra note 79, at 111-16.
144

See Kesan & Shah, supra note 79, at 169-70.

145

See Werbach, supra note 2, at 1252-53.

146

Kende, supra note 64, at 45.

147

Id.

148

Id.

149

See Werbach, supra note 2, at 1255.
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of what pricing arrangement applies when the parties agree to a positive charge
in a transit situation.
Backbone interconnection is an economic decision. Networks handing off
traffic to each other have customers that benefit from the exchange. However,
the relative benefits and costs of the exchange to each network may vary
depending on the circumstances.150 Customers of a small network gain more
from reaching a big network, for example. Therefore, the economically efficient
pricing regime may involve a positive charge from one network to the other.
Moreover, many network interconnection situations involve a “build vs. buy”
decision. Peering requires each network to construct infrastructure to a common
point or points.151 Transit is a service that networks can purchase from others.
Each network must weigh the relative benefits of extending its own infrastructure
to carry the traffic in question to its destination, versus relying on another
network to do so.152
By distinguishing peering from transit, while treating the boundary line as an
evolving negotiation between market participants and allowing significant
flexibility in transit pricing arrangement, the Internet economic model optimally
addresses the full range of networks. By allowing any network of sufficient size
and scope to become a top-tier “peer” with others, and still allowing smaller
networks to reap the benefits of ubiquitous connectivity, these economic
arrangements helped facilitate all the innovation that took place on top of the
infrastructure. Nonetheless, the peering system is under strain, as the next
subpart explains.
2. Fearing for peering
Disputes have flared up many times between networks that disagree about
whether both parties are entitled to free traffic exchange.153 The most visible

150 See Adam Candeub, Network Interconnection and Takings, 54 SYRACUSE L. REV.
369, 404-09 (2004).

This is inherent in the nature of peering. If each party were not responsible for
constructing infrastructure to the meet point, one network would have to pay the other to
do so.
151

152

See Candeub, supra note 150, at 404-09.

See, e.g., Kesan & Shah, supra note 79, at 112-13 (identifying difficulties in the
backbone market); Jonathan Angel, Toll Lanes on the Information Superhighway,
NETWORK, Feb. 1, 2000, at 27 (describing conflicts between Internet backbones); Denise
Pappalardo, When Private Peering Arrangements Go Bad, NETWORK WORLD, June 11,
2001, at 8 (discussing failures of private peering arrangements); Neil Weinberg,
153
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peering dispute occurred in 2005 between backbone operators Cogent and Level
3.154 Level 3 terminated its then-existing peering agreement with Cogent. Level 3
argued that because Cogent originated significantly more traffic than it received,
the relationship was more expensive for Level 3. Because Level 3 terminated
more of the traffic, it had to invest more in its own infrastructure. Therefore,
Level 3 claimed, Cogent was more appropriately classified as a paying transit
customer.155 Cogent insisted that it should still be entitled to settlement-free
peering with Level 3. When negotiations failed, Level 3 severed the links between
the two networks. This caused connectivity outages for customers of both
networks.156 Eventually, amid threads of government intervention, Level 3 reestablished the link. The companies ultimately negotiated an agreement,
although its terms were confidential.157
The Cogent-Level 3 dispute was an isolated occurrence affecting a small
subset of Internet users.158 Changes in the backbone market, however, could
break down the traditional peering equilibrium. The centripetal dynamics at the
physical layer of the Internet operate effectively because there has been no truly

Backbone Bullies, FORBES, June 12, 2000, at 236 (describing the exercise of market power
by backbones); see also Joan Engebretson, Level 3: Whiner or Visionary, TELEPHONY,
May 25, 1998, at 7 (describing MCI-WorldCom’s refusal to peer with Level 3); John J.
Keller, Level 3 Assails the WorldCom-MCI Deal, WALL ST. J., May 20, 1998, at B10.
See Stacy Cowley, Level 3, Cogent Call Time Out on Peering Spat, IDG NEWS
SERVICE, Oct. 10, 2005, http://www.infoworld.com/article/05/10/10/HNlevel3cogent
_1.html?P-TO-P.
154

See Level 3 Issues Statement Concerning Internet Peering and Cogent
Communications, PR NEWSWIRE, Oct. 7, 2005, http://www.prnewswire.com/cgibin/stories.pl?ACCT=104&STORY=/www/story/10-07-2005/0004164041.
155

The exact impact was difficult to gauge, because most users can reach virtually any
point on the Internet through more than one backbone. More pervasive peering disputes,
or disputes between the very largest backbones, would have more significant
consequences.
156

157

See Cowley, supra note 154.

158 There have undoubtedly been other significant peering disputes, but because these
negotiations and contractual terms are almost always confidential, few examples are
public.
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However, the possibilities for new arrangements are

Consider one such scenario. AT&T and Verizon are the dominant Internet
backbones. They are among the largest backbones in terms of traffic and
geographic coverage. More importantly, they are the only large backbones to also
control last-mile connectivity161 in significant parts of the country, and to have
large numbers of retail broadband subscribers. Verizon and AT&T might
establish a peering relationship with one another and refuse to offer such peering
to other backbones. The cable industry is poised to do something similar for its
VOIP services.162
Such a move by Verizon and AT&T would likely push other major backbones,
such as Level 3 and Qwest, to partner or be acquired by competitors of the two
dominant backbones. For example, Comcast already has an arrangement with
Level 3 to lease significant quantities of dark fiber, which provides additional
capacity that can be “lit” at a later date. Comcast individually, or the major cable
operators collectively, or the cable operators and Sprint Nextel, which are in an
alliance for wireless broadband, could purchase one or more of these major
backbones. Google and Microsoft, both of which have grand ambitions and vast
assets through their market capitalization, would also be in the mix as potential
acquirers.
If such a scenario came to pass, the Internet backbone could evolve away
from the current uneven but relatively stable market structure, in which large
backbones have an advantage over smaller players but where universal
connectivity is preserved through market forces.163 The new backbone ecosystem

159 The equilibrium of many competitive backbones avoids the network effects
problem that allows one network to dominate. See infra Part IV.B.

See Robert Frieden, Without Public Peer: The Potential Regulatory and
Universal Service Consequences of Internet Balkanization, 3 VA. J.L. & TECH. 8, 30-34
(1998).
160

The last mile is the final run of network wiring (or wireless signal) from a network
operator’s office to a house or business.
161

See Carol Wilson, VON: Cable Close to National VOIP Peering, TELEPHONY
ONLINE, May 21, 2007, http://telephonyonline.com/voip/technology/cable_voip_
peering_032107/.
162

In reviewing the market structure of the backbone in connection with Verizon’s
acquisition of MCI, the FCC concluded that, “[s]o long as there is ‘rough equality’ among
backbone providers, each has an incentive to peer with the others to provide universal
connectivity to the Internet.” See In re Verizon Communications Inc. and MCI, Inc.
163
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would be dominated by, in all likelihood, two to three independent “archipelagos”
involving a combination of backbone, last-mile, and content/information service
assets.
In contrast to the status quo, these archipelagos probably would not provide
seamless connectivity to one another. Especially if information service, content
providers, or both, were in the ownership mix, backbones would look for ways to
provide preferential transport to their partners. A Verizon DSL customer would,
in all likelihood, still be able to reach Google’s website because customers would
demand such access and regulators would probably mandate it. However, the
quality of access, and the menu of offerings available to customers, would vary
depending on their choice of access provider. The environment would look
similar to the online services ecosystem in the late 1980s, just prior to the
explosion of the commercial Internet.164 The archipelagos would provide
interconnectivity for established applications where it was expected, such as
email, but would vie to use exclusivity or price/product discrimination for new
services, content, and applications.
Concern over Internet backbones failing to peer with one another, resulting in
a balkanized Internet, is not unprecedented. In the early days of the commercial
Internet, when the UUNet backbone achieved a degree of market power, it set
about trying to pressure other backbones into less advantageous interconnection
agreements.165 In the late 1990s, there were significant disputes about peering
policies, which led to predictions than the Internet would fragment.166 In various
FCC and Department of Justice merger review proceedings at the time,
competitiveness of the backbone was a major issue. Sprint and WorldCom
abandoned their proposed merger largely because the Department of Justice
announced its intention to block the combination for promoting excessive
consolidation of the Internet backbone.167
The difference today is that the largest backbones are also the dominant
access providers. They have the ability to leverage their monopoly control over
Applications for Approval of Transfer of Control, 20 F.C.C.R. 18433, 18496 para. 118
(2005) (mem. op. & order).
164 For example, email was not fully interoperable among online services such as
Compuserve and Prodigy for some time. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
165

See Frieden, supra note 160, at 10 n.15; Kende, supra note 64, at 47-48.

166

See sources cited supra note 165.

See Complaint at 9-11, United States v. WorldCom, No. 00-CV-1526 (D.D.C. June
26, 2000), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f5000/5051.pdf.
167

{Page 30}

The Centripetal Network

Kevin Werbach

the “last mile” to a particular user into the more competitive backbone market.
Moreover, they are major providers of voice and video services that Internetbased alternatives such as Skype and YouTube might threaten. Even if no player
has market power in the backbone market itself, incentives to preserve peering,
and the broader linkage it promotes across the physical layer, are diminishing.
Recently, another threat to backbone interconnectivity has emerged in the
form of patents on methods to interconnect VOIP services with the public
telephone networks. Several companies, beginning with Verizon, successfully
sued Vonage, the leading independent, equipment-based VOIP provider, for
infringing on VOIP interconnection patents.168 The bulk of the patents were for
interconnection techniques.169 The possibility that interconnection on the
Internet will no longer be a matter of technical sufficiency and business
agreement, but rather require negotiation with a group of intellectual property
right-holders, adds a frightening new dimension to the backbone balkanization
equation. With voice traffic increasingly migrating to VOIP, even for incumbent
operators, the patent overhang becomes substantial. Controversial suits against
Microsoft, Research in Motion, and eBay have illustrated the extreme confusion
and disruption that patent litigation can generate.170 When the patent is the
means for interconnecting participants in the network, the threat is even more
severe.
The foundations of the universal interconnected Internet are thus not as
stable as they may seem. The same pattern is emerging at higher levels of
functionality. Above the physical layer of network backbones and the logical
layer of addressing are the applications such as the World Wide Web and email
that users interact with directly. These are subject to their own balkanizing
forces, in the form of efforts to violate the application neutrality of the network.

168

See Verizon Servs. Corp. v. Vonage Holdings Corp., 503 F.3d 1295, 1311 (E.D. Va.
2007); Leslie Cauley, Vonage Chief Stays Sunny About the Future, USA TODAY, Jan. 28,
2008, at B4; Olga Kharif, Collecting on an Old Phone Bill, BUSINESS WEEK, Mar. 26,
2007, at 13; Michael Orey, A Higher Hurdle for Inventors, BUSINESS WEEK, May 14, 2007,
at 38; Carol Wilson, The Patent Problem, TELEPHONY ONLINE, Apr. 9, 2007,
http://telephonyonline.com/regulatory/commentary/telecom_patent_problem/.
169 See Danny Adams, VoIPers Gain Interconnection Rights, Lose Patent Suit, IP
BUSINESS, Apr. 1, 2007, http://www.ipbusinessmag.com/articles.php?issue_id=24
&article_id=94.
170 See, e.g., U.S. BlackBerry Users in Confusion, as the Fight Goes On, 24X7
UPDATES, Feb. 25, 2006, http://www.24x7updates.com/FullStory-News-U_S_BlackBerry
_Users_in_ confusion _as_the_fight_goes_on-ID-200929.html (last visited Nov. 12,
2008).
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C. Network Neutrality and Application Balkanization
A core design feature of the Internet is that it is not limited to providing a
particular application or class of application. In the words of renowned Internet
engineer David Clark, it is “oblivious” to the uses of the network.171 Any service
that can be encapsulated into the TCP/IP protocol stack can be delivered over the
network.172 This makes the Internet very different from platforms, such as the
public switched telephone network, which are highly optimized for one kind of
service.173 The telephone network does an excellent job of delivering reliable,
good-quality voice phone calls, but its suitability for other applications is limited.
The Internet promotes innovation because the network itself is not optimized for
one service and is flexible enough to support unanticipated applications.174
Because the Internet knows nothing about applications, it can serve as a universal
platform to connect all of them.
Today, the Internet’s indifference to applications is breaking down. Retail
broadband access in the United States is largely a duopoly, with major cable and
telephone companies dominating the market.175 Two companies — AT&T and
Verizon — control the lion’s share of the nationwide DSL access market; a small
number of cable operators, led by Comcast and Time Warner, are their primary
competitors.176 Further, the FCC classified both DSL and cable modem access as
171 DAVID CLARK ET AL., NEW ARCH: FUTURE GENERATION INTERNET ARCHITECTURE 22
(2003), available at http://www.isi.edu/newarch/iDOCS/final.finalreport.pdf; see also
Bernard Aboba & Elwyn Davies, Internet Eng’g Task Force, Reflections on Internet
Transparency (July 2007) (Request for Comments No. 4924), http://tools.ietf.org/rfc/
rfc4924.txt.
172 TCP/IP stands for transmission control protocol / Internet protocol. It is the
standard format for the packets of digital information that traverse the Internet.
173 There are some optimizations (e.g. more file transfer than real-time services)
implicit in the protocol design, based on assumption of the engineers at the time.
However, such tradeoffs are necessary in any engineered system. The Internet protocols
may express an implicit bias for certain applications, but they in no way preclude other
applications, nor do they prevent network operators, service providers, and equipment
vendors from devising clever techniques to circumvent the limitations in the protocol.

See J. Kempf & R. Austein, Internet Eng’g Task Force, The Rise of the Middle and
the Future of End-to-End: Reflections on the Evolution of the Internet Architecture
(Mar. 2004) (Request for Comments No. 3724), http://tools.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3724.txt.
174

See CHARLES H. FERGUSON, THE BROADBAND PROBLEM: ANATOMY OF A MARKET
FAILURE AND A POLICY DILEMMA 132 (2004); Rob Pegoraro, Broadband Is Too Important
to Be Left to Cable-Phone Duopoly, WASH. POST, Aug. 14, 2005, at F07.
175

A few independent providers such as Earthlink remain active, but their share of
the market is small, and they depend on reselling incumbent services.
176

{Page 32}

The Centripetal Network

Kevin Werbach

“information services,” meaning that network operators are not subject to
requirements that they share their networks with competitors.177
In this environment, incumbent broadband providers could discriminate
against unaffiliated providers of Internet applications and content.178 Advocates
of “network neutrality” urge the government to adopt rules prohibiting network
operators from engaging in such discrimination.179 These advocates argue that,
without enforceable network neutrality mandates, the network owners will
dampen innovation in the application and content markets.180 The operators and
their supporters respond that they have no incentive to engage in such practices
and that neutrality mandates would constrain their own incentives to innovate
and deploy new broadband services.181
There is an unappreciated danger in the fight. A non-neutral Internet is also
a non-uniform Internet. If network operators begin cutting special deals with
content and application providers, the capabilities a user enjoys will increasingly
depend on which access provider they use. Baseline Internet connectivity will
still be universally available, but users will be choosing a set of capabilities tied to
their access mechanism.
In opposition to network neutrality mandates, Christopher Yoo argues that
there is a choice between promoting network neutrality and what he calls
network diversity — an environment in which networks make different choices

See In re Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet over Cable and
Other Facilities, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798, 4819 (2002) (declaratory ruling and notice of proposed
rulemaking) (concerning cable modem service); In re Appropriate Framework for
Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities, 17 F.C.C.R. 3019, 3019 (2002)
(notice of proposed rulemaking) (concerning DSL service); Werbach, supra note 2, at
1268.
177

178

See sources cited supra note 2.

See Petitioner for Declaratory Ruling at 3, In re the Petition of Free Press et al. for
Declaratory Ruling that Degrading an Internet Application Violates the FCC’s Internet
Policy Statement and Does Not Meet an Exception for ‘Reasonable Network
Management,’ No. 07-52 (FCC Nov. 1, 2007), available at http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov
/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?Native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document=6519810275; Wu, Network
Neutrality, supra note 2, at 8; Ex Parte Submission in CS Docket No. 02-52 from
Timothy Wu, Professor of Law, Univ. of Va., and Lawrence Lessig, Professor of Law,
Stanford Univ., to Marlene H. Dortch, Sec’y, FCC 12-15 (Aug. 22, 2003)
(http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document=6514
683884) [hereinafter Wu & Lessig, Ex Parte].
179

180

See Wu & Lessig, Ex Parte, supra note 179, at 12-15.

See Yoo, Beyond Network Neutrality, supra note 2, at 52; Yoo, Economics of
Congestion, supra note 2, at 1887-89.
181
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about architecture, pricing, and services.182 Yoo attacks network neutrality
mandates on the grounds that they flatten such distinctions, and thereby reduce
incentives for novel competitive entry in the broadband market.183 As an analogy,
Yoo points to the NFL Sunday Ticket offering on the DirecTV direct broadcast
satellite service.184 This exclusive football package encouraged many sports fans
to select DirecTV over cable, increasing the competitiveness of the multi-channel
video programming market.
Whether or not Yoo is correct that the benefits of network diversity are
superior to those of network neutrality, there is an important aspect of his
analysis that bears highlighting. The more “diverse” a new entrant’s business
model, the more it will diverge from the universal connectivity model of the
established Internet. A network diversity principle would open the door for
greater divergence from the experience of a single, uniform Internet. This may be
a worthwhile tradeoff, or there may be enough other constraints to prevent
networks from straying too far from neutrality. However, it is impossible to be
certain.
Variation among access providers is not the only trend that may cause the
Internet to balkanize as an application platform. Content and application
providers may seek similar special deals with operators in situations where they
feel they have leverage. For example, ESPN, the cable sports programmer, offers
a slate of special online content through ESPN360.com, which is only available to
customers of broadband access providers that pay ESPN a supplemental fee.185
The result is similar to what would happen if some broadband providers blocked
the ESPN service, but in this case it is ESPN’s desirable content that drives the
business relationship. There is nothing fundamentally improper in ESPN or any
other content provider holding out for such a payment. Network neutrality
proponents would distinguish the ESPN 360 arrangement on the grounds that
ESPN lacks the market power or control over expensive physical infrastructure
that might allow network operators to abuse their position. The result, however,
is to move closer to an environment that lacks the universality of today’s Internet.

182

Yoo, Beyond Network Neutrality, supra note 2, at 18-19.

Yoo’s claim is that policy-makers should be most concerned about broadband
competition, because it addresses the ultimate problem, and therefore the network
neutrality tradeoff isn’t worth it. See id. at 9.
183
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See id. at 32.

See George Ou, Is ESPN Committing Reverse Net Neutrality?, ZDNET, June 21,
2006, http://blogs.zdnet.com/Ou/?p=251.
185
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In the future, the underpinnings of the application-indifferent Internet are
likely to break down further. The rapid growth of online video distribution is
causing network operators to consider deploying “deep packet inspection”
capabilities to differentiate their treatment of traffic on an application-byapplication basis.186 Video files are so much larger than other forms of Internet
content that they already make up a substantial portion of global Internet traffic,
and a substantial majority of the bits flowing over many broadband access
networks.187
Therefore, access providers seeking to differentiate video traffic and charge
differently for it, either to end-users or to content providers, can reasonably
argue that they are simply making an efficient economic move.188 Much like
firms practicing price discrimination in other industries, access providers will
argue that if the relatively small number of heavy video users pay more, most
users will pay less.189 Some broadband providers are cutting off or throttling back
heavy users or file-sharing applications that they claim are monopolizing network
bandwidth.190
For wireless Internet access, most network operators already cap “unlimited”
plans and charge special fees for applications such as live streaming TV and
ringtone downloads.191 The wireless industry has a unique history, regulatory
status, and technical issues. Until recently, the “wireless Internet” was something
of a misnomer. Now, with devices such as the Apple iPhone promising a full Web
experience and third-generation wireless networks delivering near-broadband
speeds, the two worlds are converging. If the result is something closer to the

See Andrew Packer, The True Picture of Peer-to-Peer Filesharing, CACHELOGIC
PRESENTATION,
July
2,
2004,
at
12,
available
at
http://www.cachelogic.com/press/CacheLogic_Press_and_Analyst_Presentation_July2
004.pdf.
186

187 See Kevin Werbach, The Implications of Video P2P on Network Usage, in VIDEO
PEER TO PEER 97, 101 (Eli M. Noam & Lorenzo Maria Pupillo eds., 2008).
188

Yoo, Economics of Congestion, supra note 2, at 1864.

In economics, price discrimination has no derogatory connotation. The idea is
simply that firms can sometimes maximize total welfare by charging some customers
more than others. See generally CARL SHAPIRO & HAL VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES: A
STRATEGIC GUIDE TO THE NETWORK ECONOMY (1998) (arguing that classic economic
principles still offer strategic value in technological marketplace).
189

See Declan McCullagh, BitTorrent Firms: Comcast Throttling Is Anticompetitive,
C|NET, Feb. 14, 2008, http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-9872464-38.html.
190

191

See Tim Wu, Wireless Carterfone, 1 INT’L J. COMM. 389, 405-06 (2007).
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wireless model, it will represent a significant shift in how users experience the
Internet.

D. Digital Copyright: Information Balkanization
The final links holding the Internet together arise at the content layer, based
on a set of legal constructs. Specifically, content pulls itself together on the
Internet through the widespread exploitation of a grey area in intellectual
property law. That grey area may soon divide into black and white boundaries. If
it does, the foundation for many Internet services that today are taken for
granted, such as search engines, may disappear.
This section elucidates, in Subpart 1, how intellectual property rules define
the connective tissue of the Internet at the content layer. Subpart 2 explains how
litigation challenges threaten this connective tissue.
1. Linkage at the content layer
The content passing across the Internet is, like any other fixed expression of
ideas, entitled to intellectual property protection. The text of a Web page, or
digital material such as books, songs, and television shows stored on file servers,
are all subject to the infringement prohibitions of copyright law. All property
rights serve to distinguish one person’s assets, with their associated bundle of
rights, from others’ assets.192 Drawing such boundaries produces tremendous
benefits by unlocking the potential for investment and innovation associated with
both tangible and intangible assets.193
Yet the benefits of legal enforcement of property rights come at a cost.
Property rights necessarily limit the freedom of non-owners.194 The dangers from
over-aggressive enforcement of property rights are especially great for intangible

192 See JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, ENTITLEMENT:
THE PARADOXES OF PROPERTY 6
(2000); Kevin Werbach, Supercommons: Toward a Unified Theory of Wireless
Communication, 82 TEX. L. REV. 863, 918 (2004) (“The question, therefore, is how to
draw the boundaries.”).

See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347,
350 (1967).
193

194 See Werbach, supra note 192, at 885; see also LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF
IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD 168 (2001), available at
http://thefutureofideas.s3.amazonaws.com/lessig_FOI.pdf.
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goods such as intellectual property, which are otherwise economically nonrival.195
Without copyright protection, for example, everyone could have a copy of a song
or a piece of software, without exhausting the resource. Of course, such an
arrangement would likely eliminate the economic incentive to create the
resource, which is why some intellectual property protections are necessary.
However, too stringent a regime can have spillover effects on innovation, and can
produce a “tragedy of the anti-commons” in which too many fragmented owners
prevent effective use of the resource.196
Intellectual property on the Internet has been an active legal battleground.197
To date however, there have been few overt controversies over unauthorized
reuse of online content. Search engines index, copy, and redisplay millions of
pieces of copyrighted content every day without permission.198 Internet service
providers and application providers host and aggregate information they do not
own, and that in some cases infringes on the rights of content owners.
Search engine indexing is perhaps the best example of accepted content reuse
online. We take it for granted that search engines such as Google, Ask.com and
Yahoo! can index sites on the World Wide Web.199 Search engines are now so
ingrained as the starting points for use of the Internet, and content reuse is so
central to search engines, that the idea of their operation as a copyright violation
at first is perplexing. However, what most search engines do is, for their own
economic benefit and without receiving any affirmative authorization, copy,
store, and redisplay copyrighted content of other authors.200

195

See LESSIG, supra note 194, at 237.

196 See Dan Burk, The Trouble with Trespass, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 27, 49
(2000); Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as Place, and the Tragedy of the Digital Anticommons,
91 CAL. L. REV. 439, 509-13 (2003); Mark A. Lemley & Brett M. Frischmann, Spillovers,
107 COLUM. L. REV. 257, 281 (2007).
197 See LESSIG, supra note 194, at 207-09; see, e.g., A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster,
Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding Napster file-sharing service guilty of
contributory copyright infringement); see also Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v.
Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 931-41 (2005) (refining Napster’s theory for secondary
copyright liability).

See Siva Vaidyanathan, Copryight Jungle, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., Sept.-Oct.
2006, at 42, 44, available at http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1012
&context=james_grimmelmann (“One of the least understood concepts of Google’s
business is that it copies everything.”).
198

See James Grimmelman, The Structure of Search Engine Law, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1,
6 (2007).
199

200

See id. at 27-28.
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All major Internet search engines use the same basic approach. They send
out “spiders” — automated programs that follow hyperlinks from page to page on
the web — recording information about those pages as they go along. Among
other things, the spiders copy the text of the page into the search engine’s
database, typically in a compressed format to speed retrieval.201 Some search
engines, most notably Google, also keep a full readable copy of most sites in their
local database, allowing users to retrieve the page from the search engine’s cache
rather than from the origin site itself.202
Search engines therefore do many things that seem to constitute, at first
glance, copyright infringement.203 Yet there has been little legal scrutiny of their
behavior. Only a handful of cases have parsed whether a search engine may be
engaging in a copyright violation.204
As a practical matter, content reuse is prevalent online because it benefits
content owners. Search engines are the starting points for most Internet users. If
something isn’t listed in a search engine, it effectively does not exist. The search
engines pass off users to the origin sites once they return their results, so allowing
a search engine to index a page doesn’t prevent the content owner from
monetizing that same page through advertisements or other means. If pressed,
search engines could advance three primary legal theories to defend their
indexing of online content: fair use, implied license, and statutory safe harbors.
Fair use is a well established and statutorily grounded, yet notoriously vague,
aspect of copyright law. It allows re-use of copyrighted material under
circumstances, such as educational applications, parodies, and de minimis
copying, where the balance of equities favors the copier over the exclusion.205
Search engines typically display only a small excerpt of the indexed page, with a

201

See id. at 7-8.

202 See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1156 n.3 (9th Cir. 2007)
(“Google’s cache saves copies of a large number of webpages so that Google’s search
engine can efficiently organize and index these webpages.”).
203 See DAVID L. HAYES, ADVANCED COPYRIGHT ISSUES ON THE INTERNET 15 (2004),
available
at
http://www.fenwick.com/docstore/355/Advanced_Copyright_02-2904.pdf; Grimmelman, supra note 199, at 27-28.
204 See Parker v. Google, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d 492 , 494-95 (E.D. Pa. 2006), aff’d, 242
F. App’x 833, 837 (3d Cir. 2007) (per curiam); Field v. Google, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106,
1124 (D. Nev. 2006). In both cases, the courts declined to impose liability on Google.
205 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1976) (defining statutory elements of fair use); Harper & Row,
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560-61 (1985). See generally WILLIAM F.
PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT LAW (1985) (describing fair use).
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link to the original site. However, this is not always the case. Google caches and
makes available the full text of most pages in its search index, and its book search
service stores the full text of a book.206 An alternative hypothesis is that websites
have tacitly and collectively authorized search engines to copy and index their
pages, under the legal theory of implied license.207 Perhaps content providers
would be entitled to stop search engines and other online service providers from
using their content, but they simply have not. Under an implied license theory,
the content owners’ silence, with awareness about the scope of copying, is
tantamount to a limited waiver of their intellectual property rights.208
The final theory for content re-use is that it is protected under the legal safe
harbors established under the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (“Telecom
Act”)209 or the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”).210 Section 230 of the
Telecom Act immunizes ISPs from liability for content that merely resides on
their networks.211 Section 512 of the DMCA incorporates a more complex safe
harbor regime, in which service providers must take down allegedly infringing
materials upon notice from copyright holders in order to qualify.212
Though most Internet users and service providers take widespread online
content reuse for granted, its foundations remain shaky. Pending litigation may
produce a dramatic change in the environment.

206 See Hannibal Travis, Google Book Search and Fair Use: iTunes for Authors, or
Napster for Books?, 61 U. MIAMI L. REV. 87, 131-33 (2006); John S. Sieman, Comment,
Using the Implied License To Inject Common Sense into Digital Copyright, 85 N.C. L.
REV. 885, 906-09 (2007).
207

See Sieman, supra note 206, at 921-23.

208

See id.

Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified in
scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
209

210

17 U.S.C. § 512(a)-(d), (j) (2000).

211 47 U.S.C. § 230 (1996). This provision was incorporated into the legislation to
counterbalance the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”) provisions, which made it
illegal to post indecent material on the Internet. The CDA was declared unconstitutional,
but the safe harbor provisions, and their associated language about the value of an
unfettered Internet, remained in the statute.

See Mark A. Lemley, Rationalizing Internet Safe Harbors, 6 J. ON TELECOMM. &
HIGH TECH. L. 101, 103-04 (2007).
212
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2. Breakdown of voluntary content reuse
Content owners are beginning to chafe at the ways that search engines and
online service providers make use of their content.213 Moreover, online services
are pushing the boundaries of copyright law in new ways, making content owners
uncomfortable that they will lose control and revenues. YouTube and other video
sharing sites have exploded in popularity in recent years, with YouTube agreeing
to sell itself to Google for over $1.5 billion less than two years after its launch.214
Unlike Napster and other peer-to-peer file-sharing services, who argued they
had no control over the content flowing across their networks, YouTube is a
traditional central storage site, which hosts all videos available to its users.215
YouTube’s defense to copyright infringement is squarely based on the DMCA safe
harbor provisions.216 Some content owners are not satisfied that YouTube does
all it could do to prevent infringing material from appearing on its site or to
remove such material once it’s there. As a result, content owners have begun
filing suit. Viacom’s lawsuit, seeking over $1 billion in damages from YouTube, is
a high-profile test of YouTube’s claims.217
Google’s Book Search service has also raised the issue of Internet content
reuse. Google has launched a massive project to digitally scan books and make
them searchable through its search engine.218 Google’s project, in partnership
with major university libraries, includes two components. The first component
involves scanning books that are in the public domain, primarily older works that
are no longer covered by copyright protection. The more controversial part of the

See also David Lazarus, Pay-to-Play is One Way to Help Save Newspapers,
SFGATE.COM, Mar. 14, 2007, http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/c/a/2007/
03/14/BUG4COKGDU1.DTL.
213

Sara Kehaulani, Google Gambles on Web Video, WASH. POST, Oct. 6, 2006, at A01,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/09/
AR2006100900546.html.
214

See Seagrumn Smith, From Napster to Kazaa: The Battle over Peer-to-Peer
Filesharing Goes International, DUKE L. & TECH. REV., Mar. 2003, at 1, 1-3, available at
http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/2003dltr0008.html.
215

See Amanda Bronstad, Video Web Sites Download a Defense, NAT’L L.J., Oct.
2006, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1162375515690.
216

See Nate Anderson, Viacom Sues YouTube for “Brazen” Copyright Infringement,
ARS TECHNICA, Mar. 13, 2007, http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20070313-viacomsues-youtube-for-copyright-infringement.html.
217

See Google Book Search, Legal Analysis, http://books.google.com/googlebooks/
legal.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2008).
218
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program involves scanning books that are still under copyright.219 For these
works, Google places a complete copy of the scanned book in its database. It
indexes that material, so that a user can search on anything within the book.
However, Google does not display the entire book, as it does for the publicdomain material. It provides a small snippet of content around the search term,
and a few excerpts from the original book.220
Google claims that it is providing a service to both readers and publishers by
making it easier to find books.221 From a legal perspective, Google argues that its
actions are protected by fair use and by the DMCA’s safe harbor provisions.222
The publishing industry sees it differently. Google requires publishers to opt out
of including their copyrighted works in the Book Search database, rather than
gaining affirmative approval from each publisher for inclusion of a work. In
opposition to this procedure, the Author’s Guild and the Association of American
Publishers filed copyright infringement suits against Google in 2005.223
In launching its Book Search service, Google is betting that it will prevail in
the copyright litigation. If Google loses, the impact could go well beyond one
company and one service. A precedent requiring affirmative consent from
copyright holders before indexing protected content would throw into question
the more common practice of indexing Web content.
Congress originally created the DMCA and Telecom Act safe harbor
provisions to protect ISPs and online services, which necessarily stored usergenerated content.224 A safe harbor approach made sense because it would have
been unreasonable to require access providers to vet every piece of content one of
their users placed on their servers. Google Book Search is a somewhat different
situation. In Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., the Supreme
219

See Travis, supra note 206, at 95-99.

220

Google also provides links to where the original book can be obtained. Id. at 131.

221

Eric Schmidt, Books of Revelation, WALL ST. J., Oct. 18, 2005, at A18.

222

See Travis, supra note 206, at 126-39 (analyzing Google’s fair use claims).

See Complaint at 2, McGraw Hill Co. v. Google, Inc., No. 05 Civ. 8881 (S.D.N.Y.
Oct. 19, 2005), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/2692021/The-McGrawHillCompanies-Inc-et-al-v-Google-Inc-Document-No-1?ga_related_doc=1; Complaint at 2,
Author’s Guild v. Google, Inc., No. 05 Civ. 8136 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2005), available at
http://www.scribd.com/doc/2691192/The-Authoraposs-Guild-et-al-v-Google-IncDocument-No-1.
223

224 See Alicia L. Wright, Newsgroups Float into Safe Harbor, and Copyright Holders
Are Sunk, DUKE L. & TECH. REV., Nov. 2006, at 1, 13-14, available at
http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/2006dltr0019.html.
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Court ultimately imposed liability on a peer-to-peer file-sharing service, even
though the service had the “substantial non-infringing uses” that would
ordinarily be a shield against secondary liability.225 A similar decision in the
Google Book Search or YouTube litigation could add devastating uncertainty to
the entire Internet content economy.
Google may be doing the right thing, and it may win the Book Search case.
However, Internet content re-use is now subject to high-profile scrutiny and a
direct legal challenge. The content linkages that Internet users and businesses
take for granted are in jeopardy. There will be other lawsuits, and other efforts to
erect barriers around information on the Internet. As with governance, backbone
interconnection, and network neutrality, the pressure is building to break down
the pervasive connectivity that made the Internet what it is today.
Why is the Internet fragmenting now? There are many answers and many
contributing factors. Every development described in the previous section has its
own specific causes. Yet standing behind these local factors is a deeper, more
universal reason for the current pattern: the fundamental dynamics of
interconnected networks.

III. NETWORK FORMATION DYNAMICS
All networks share characteristic properties, which researchers have only
recently begun to study closely. A branch of network science known as network
formation theory suggests exactly the pattern of fragmentation unfolding on the
Internet today. As some inter-network components — the U.S.-dominated
addressing system, large backbones, broadband access providers, and Google, for
example — achieve disproportionate power, they provoke countervailing efforts
toward balkanization. The simulations, models, and empirical research of
network scientists, applied to the Internet, can aid in understanding these
Internet developments and in developing appropriate responses.
Network formation theory demonstrates that interconnected networks such
as the Internet can grow quickly but also dissolve quickly. The greatest threat to

225 545 U.S. 913, 948 (2005). The “substantial non-infringing use” test arose from the
celebrated Sony Betamax case, in which the Supreme Court refused to ban the video
cassette recorder because it had non-infringing as well as infringing applications. See
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 456 (1984).
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continued stability is the network itself. Growing networks of independent,
economically motivated actors are inherently unstable.226 If they become stable,
they are most likely configured inefficiently.227 Both outcomes pose threats to the
continued vibrancy of the Internet.
This Part introduces the science of networks and its implications for the
future of the Internet. Subpart A summarizes the key elements of network
science. Subpart B delves into the extension of network science — network
formation theory — that is most relevant to the issues of Internet balkanization.
Finally, Subpart C ties in two other key findings of network science — the “smallworlds” effect and scale-free distributions — which are consistent with the
network formation results.

A. A New Science
Networks are ubiquitous in modern society, as well as in the physical and
biological world.228 In formal terms, a network is a collection of nodes tied
together with links.229 In the airline industry, airports are the nodes and routes
between them are the links. In a social setting, the nodes may be the individuals,
and the links their relationships: friendship, sexual contacts, or business
partners. In the Internet infrastructure, for example, the routers are the nodes
and the data lines are the links. On the Web, the web pages are the nodes and the
hyperlinked pointers between them are the links.230 It is no coincidence that as
communications, information, energy, logistics, and transportation networks
have spread across the globe, network structures have assumed greater
importance in society.231

226

See infra Part III.B.3.

227

See infra Part III.B.3.

See generally MARK BUCHANAN, NEXUS: SMALL WORLDS AND THE GROUNDBREAKING
SCIENCE OF NETWORKS (2002) (explaining network theory); DUNCAN J. WATTS, SIX
DEGREES: THE SCIENCE OF A CONNECTED AGE (2003) (same).
228

The formal modeling of networks uses a branch of mathematics called graph
theory. See Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher Yoo, On the Regulation of Networks as
Complex Systems: A Graph Theory Approach, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1687, 1695-99 (2005).
The terms “edges” and “vertices” are used interchangeably with “nodes” and “links.” Id.
at 1693 n.17.
229

See Réka Albert et al., Diameter of the World Wide Web, 401 NATURE 130, 130
(1999) (analyzing network structure of Web).
230

231

See MANUEL CASTELLS, THE RISE OF THE NETWORK SOCIETY 1 (2d ed. 2000).
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Network science studies the generic properties of these and other networks.
It draws upon several disciplines, including statistical physics, sociology, applied
mathematics, biology, complexity theory, economics, and computer science.232
Despite its broad area of inquiry and youth as a coherent field, network science
has produced many impressive results.233 One of network science’s leading
practitioners labels it “the science of the connected age.”234 Insights from
network science are starting to be applied to legal questions.235 In recent years,
scholars have utilized network science to analyze business models for electronic
commerce,236 pricing regulation for unbundled telecommunications network
elements,237 the patent system,238 privacy,239 and Internet security.240 Network
science is also beginning to show up in the analysis of information and
communications policy questions.241

232 The boundaries of these various disciplines are not universally accepted.
In
particular, scholars differ on whether network science is a sub-discipline of complexity
theory, or the reverse, and use a variety of terms to refer to both fields. Adding to the
confusion, some of the literature uses the terms “network science” or “network theory” to
describe what this paper treats as sub-domains of the larger field, particularly the
economic scholarship around network effects. In this paper, I use the term “network
science” to address those disciplines concerned with the behavior of complex, evolving,
networked systems.

See generally BUCHANAN, supra note 228 (summarizing significant findings of
network theory); WATTS, supra note 228 (explaining same).
233

That is the subtitle of Watts’s book, Six Degrees. See WATTS, supra note 228; see
also M.E.J. Newman, The Structure and Function of Complex Networks, 45 SIAM REV.
167, 180-96 (2003) (describing common properties of networks).
234

See Strandburg, supra note 3, at 1295 n.6 (noting relative paucity but significant
richness of legal scholarship using tools from network science).
235

236 See generally CHRIS ANDERSON, THE LONG TAIL: WHY THE FUTURE OF BUSINESS IS
SELLING LESS OF MORE (2006) (showing how “power law” distributions, a concept from
network theory, appear commonly in e-commerce markets).
237

See Spulber & Yoo, supra note 229, at 1707.

238

See Strandburg, supra note 3, at 1318-19.

Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy, 72 U. CHI. L. REV.
919, 946-47 (2005).
239

See Réka Albert et al., Error and Attack Tolerance of Complex Networks, 406
NATURE 378, 380-82 (2000). But see David Alderson & Walter Willinger, A Contrasting
Look at Self-Organization in the Internet and Next-Generation Communications
Networks, IEEE COMM., July 2005, at 94, 96 (noting that descriptions of Internet
structure based on statistical physics fail to capture properties derived from its actually
engineering design).
240

241 See generally David G. Post & David R. Johnson, “Chaos Prevailing On Every
Continent”: Towards a New Theory of Decentralized Decision-Making in Complex
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Network science covers a great deal of ground. One branch in particular
helps to explain the balkanization dynamics described in Part II. That branch is
known as network formation theory.

B. Network Formation Theory
1. In general
Networks can be seen as either exogenous or endogenous factors to the
behavior being studied. If exogenous, the network is taken as a given, and the
question is what participants in that network are likely to do. This is the stance of
most communications and Internet law scholarship.242 Looking only at what
happens once networks exist is a valuable simplifying assumption. Yet in the real
world, participants also decide whether to form networks, or to form new links
within those networks. For example, people evaluate whether to become friends
with each other and Internet backbones evaluate whether to peer.
A full picture of network behavior must therefore consider networks as
endogenous factors as well. In other words, networks both produce and are
produced by a collection of interactions. There is a branch of network science
called network formation that treats networks endogenously.243 Network
formation theory is a newer field of scholarship than network science generally.

Systems, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1055 (1998) (using complexity theory, cousin of network
science, to address Internet governance questions); Mark Cooper, Making the
Connection: Using Network Theory to Explain the Link Between Open Digital Platforms
and Innovation (Mar. 24, 2004) (unpublished manuscript, http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/
blogs/cooper/archives/network%20theory.pdf)
(applying
network
theory
to
telecommunications policy).
242 Daniel Spulber and Christopher Yoo, in their graph-theoretic analysis of
telecommunications interconnection pricing, expressly limit their consideration to what
they call “managed” networks, as opposed to the “spontaneous” networks that form
endogenously, even though they acknowledge that “the latter type may ultimately become
the more important way to analyze communications technologies.” See Spulber & Yoo,
supra note 229, at 1693 n.16. Intriguingly, their rationale for this limitation is “the
dominance of a handful of infrastructure providers.” Id.

See Matthew O. Jackson, A Survey of Models of Network Formation: Stability
and Efficiency, in GROUP FORMATION IN ECONOMICS: NETWORKS, CLUBS AND COALITIONS
11, 25-26 (Gabrielle Demange & Myrna Wooders eds., 2005), available at
http://www.stanford.edu/~jacksonm/netsurv.pdf; Matthew O. Jackson, Network
Formation, in 5 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 906, 907 (Steven N.
Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blumem eds., 2d ed. 2008) [hereinafter Jackson, Network
Formation].
243

{Page 45}

The Centripetal Network

Kevin Werbach

As such, there are many questions it has yet to tackle in both the theoretical and
empirical cases.244 Therefore, application of network formation theory to
concrete questions of Internet law and governance must necessarily be
preliminary and tentative.
Nonetheless, the major findings of network formation provide significant
insights regarding the future of the Internet.245 In addition to modeling the
feedback effects that participants exert on the network itself, network formation
expressly considers network structure.246 Different structures have important
consequences, such as the ease of reaching another user on the network and the
power of highly connected nodes on the network.247
There are two broad classes of network formation models.248 One set, based
on the mathematical domain of graph theory, treats link formation as essentially
random. This first set seeks to explain how observed properties in real-world
networks could develop through network growth dynamics.249 The other models,
employing game-theoretic techniques from economics, treat link formation as a
strategic decision of individual, self-interested agents.250 These economic models
can measure the relative social welfare benefits of different network structures,
and can better explain why those outcomes emerge.251 The economic models,
however, come up short in describing how networks progress through the
formation process and what they will look like at the end of the process. Despite

244 See Jackson, supra note 24, at 319 (“[W]e are only beginning to develop
theoretical models that are useful in a systematic analysis of how such network structures
form and what their characteristics are likely to be.”).
245 See ROMUALDO PASTOR-SATORRAS & ALESSANDRO VESPINGANI, EVOLUTION AND
STRUCTURE OF THE INTERNET: A STATISTICAL PHYSICS APPROACH 84 (2004) (“In recent
years we have witnessed a change of perspective in the theoretical study of complex
networks that shifts the modeling focus from the reproduction of the network’s structure
to the modeling of its evolution. This new approach is the outcome of the realization that
most complex networks — the Internet being only one of the most important examples —
are the result of a growth process.”)
246

See Jackson, supra note 24, at 319.

See generally WATTS, supra note 228 (detailing dynamics of different types of
networks).
247

248 See Matthew O. Jackson, The Economics of Social Networks, in 1 ADVANCES IN
ECONOMICS AND ECONOMETRICS: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS, NINTH WORLD CONGRESS, at 1,
11 (Richard Blundell et al. eds., 2006).
249

See infra Part III.B.2.

250

See infra Part III.B.3.

251

See Jackson, supra note 248, at 20-33.
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the limitations of each method, taken together, the two approaches paint a rich
picture of network formation.252 The combination of these methods forms a set
of tools and techniques for evaluating normative questions about Internet
evolution.
2. Random network formation
The seminal early work in network formation, by Paul Erdős and Alfred Rényi
in the 1950s, modeled networks as what are called “random graphs”: sets of
nodes between which links were randomly added.253 Erdős and Rényi found that
these random graphs experienced a “phase transition” as the density of links
increased relative to the number of nodes.254 At that point, the networks rapidly
shifted from collections of small, discrete components to a single “giant
component,” which incorporated the vast majority of the nodes.255 In other
words, networks with enough links tend towards interconnection.256 They pull
themselves together.
The random graph studies show that the key factor in whether networks come
together is not their size, but their connectivity.257 The more connections there
are between participants on the network, the more likely it is that those
participants will share a common platform.258 In the real world, network links do
not simply appear arbitrarily; they have a cost. If links are cheaper to establish,

The approaches are not in conflict; they are different means of evaluating network
formation. The scholars developing random and strategic network formation models
were generally unaware of each other until recently. One of the signal developments in
the emergence of network formation as a distinct branch of network theory is the
appreciation of the complementary nature of the two approaches. See id.
252

253 See generally DOUGLAS B. WEST, INTRODUCTION TO GRAPH THEORY (2d ed. 2001)
(describing graph theory); Paul Erdős & Alfred Rényi, On Random Graphs, 6
PUBLICATIONES MATHEMATICAE DEBRECEN 290 (1959) (modeling random graphs).
254 The number of links per node is called the degree of that node. See Jackson, supra
note 248, at 3-4. The phase transition in a random graph network occurs when the
average degree of the network exceeds one. See id. at 13.
255

See id. at 13.

These models do not take into account the ownership structures of the component
networks. As noted in the previous section, the outcome in the real world may either be a
single dominant network operator, or a constellation of interconnected providers. See
Lemley & McGowen, supra note 41, at 549-50; infra text accompanying note 345.
256

257

See Jackson, supra note 248, at 13-14.

258

See id.
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there will be more of them, which therefore makes an interconnected platform
more likely.
This has, in fact, been the case. Researcher Tom Vest engaged in a large study
of “autonomous network” data measuring the degree of connectivity on the
Internet.259 He found that the key variable explaining the rate of Internet
penetration worldwide is the availability and pricing of telecommunications
circuits.260 Similar examples can be adduced at other layers. In content, for
example, the fact that search engines need not negotiate and pay a market
clearing price to incorporate online content into their indexes allows those
indexes to cover a large percentage of the publicly accessible Web, rather than
just selected portions of it.261
The point here is not just the obvious one that cheaper links mean more links,
but that cheaper links are more likely to produce a universally interconnected
platform. The reverse is also true. As links become more expensive, and thus
rarer, the network may experience a phase transition in reverse. Instead of
connectivity decaying gradually, the network may quickly switch from one in
which the bulk of users can communicate to one in which most users are trapped
in discrete sub-networks.262 Thus, network science sounds the cautionary alarm
that networks may balkanize more rapidly and more extensively than would be
expected.
3. Strategic network formation
The limitation of the random-graph models of network formation is that they
do not examine why links form. They simply assume a random process, or some
arbitrary algorithm. An alternate and complementary approach, grounded in
economic theory, begins with the recognition that the participants in networks
are self-interested actors.263 These actors are focused on maximizing their own
welfare, not the aggregate behavior of the network. Their decisions, far from

Telephone Interview with Tom Vest, Senior Economist & Policy Analyst, Coop.
Ass’n for Internet Data Analysis (Sept. 12, 2006).
259

260

See id.

261 Because search engines operate by sending out spiders that crawl the Web through
its links, content that is not connected to other portions of the network may be “invisible”
to them.
262

See Jackson, supra note 248, at 14-15.

263

See id. at 20-33.
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being random, reflect strategic tradeoffs based on the environment they see
around them.264 Such situations are the domain of game theory.
Game theory is an area of economics that studies strategic interactions
between independent actors (called “agents”) by modeling them as games.265
Consider a group of agents, who may be individuals, companies, or other actors,
that are potentially part of a network. Each agent must decide whether to form a
link between its node and those of other agents.266 The agent decides whether to
form the link by evaluating the relative costs and benefits of establishing the link.
If two agents find that the benefits of connecting exceed the costs, they will do so.
Agents benefit not only from their own links, but from the ability to reach
others on the network with whom they are not directly connected. For example,
Internet users benefit from the peering relationships between one ISP’s backbone
and other backbones, even though users are not part of those negotiations. A
user’s ability to locate documents on the Web increases when someone else
creates a link to it. This is because the link increases the likelihood that a search
engine spider will find a given document and because search engines will utilize
that link structure to match that document with the user’s query.267 The potential
disconnect between the private calculus of agents, who selfishly act based on their
own cost-benefit calculations, and the real welfare calculus for those agents,
which depends on collective behavior, is a central subject for game theory.268 The
balkanization of the Internet is an example of just such behavior.269
A burgeoning body of game-theoretic literature seeks to model how the
collective behavior of self-interested network nodes produces global network

264

See id.

See generally DREW FUDENBERG & JEAN TIROLE, GAME THEORY (1991) (describing
game theory). Game theory is the field in which John Nash, the subject of the book and
movie, A Beautiful Mind, won the Nobel Prize. The Nash Equilibrium is the point in any
game where no agent would benefit by altering its strategy.
265

266 For simplicity, this discussion, and the earlier discussion of graph theory, uses
examples of “non-directed” graphs, in which both sides must agree to form a link. There
are also “directed” graphs, such as the network of citations among academic papers.
Citations flow in only one direction; the cited paper has no say in the decision.
267

See supra Part II.D.

This is an example of the famous “prisoner’s dilemma,” in which two agents will
fail to cooperate, even though doing so would make them both better off.
268

269

See supra Part II.
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structures.270 Agents are given cost-benefit functions for linking with other
nodes, which can incorporate not only the direct benefit to the connected nodes,
but the indirect network effects that propagate out to other nodes.271 These
models reveal the equilibrium points that networks may evolve toward as their
participants employ various strategies to maximize their own welfare.
A key dimension of network formation models is pairwise stability, which was
introduced by Matthew Jackson and Asher Wolinsky.272 A network is considered
pairwise stable if no node would be better off by severing one of its links, and no
two nodes would benefit from adding a new link between them.273 For example,
an Internet backbone must constantly decide whether to add additional peering
points with other backbones, or to eliminate existing connections. It will weigh
the costs and benefits of each decision. Given a particular scenario, there may be
no pairwise stable network equilibrium. If there are one or more pairwise stable
outcomes, the models show that those network structures will likely emerge.274
A different criterion for evaluating networks is their efficiency — the extent to
which networks maximize aggregate utility for their participants. From an
economic standpoint, the goals of law and public policy are to maximize social
welfare. A network configuration that makes a few nodes better off, but most
nodes worse off, is undesirable.276 Highly concentrated networks, in which one
node dominates, are also unlikely to be efficient unless the value to the central
node is so enormous that it exceeds the cost to the other nodes.

See Matthew O. Jackson & Asher Wolinsky, A Strategic Model of Social and
Economic Networks, 71 J. ECON. THEORY 44, 45-48 (1996); Jackson, supra note 24, at
319-20.
270

See, e.g., Jackson & Wolinsky, supra note 270 (modeling network stability and
efficiency using this approach). The network formation models use the generic concept of
nodes. They apply to collections of networks deciding whether to federate and to
individual users or companies determining whether to join a network.
271

272

See id. at 47-48.

273 See Jackson, Network Formation, supra note 243, at 27-28; Jackson & Wolinsky,
supra note 270, at 51; Jackson, supra note 24, at 336. As a somewhat stylized concept,
pairwise stability only gives an indication of the robustness of a network. It does not
mean that the network will no longer evolve, or that it will not disintegrate. See Jackson,
supra note 24, at 336.

See Jackson & Wolinsky, supra note 270, at 45 (“This analysis is designed to give
us some predictions concerning which networks are likely to form . . . .”).
274

276

For simplicity, this example assumes that the harm or benefit to each node is the

same.
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To express the two technical terms colloquially, efficient networks are the
networks we want while stable networks are those we are likely to get. The key
question is: When are stable networks also efficient, and vice versa?
Unfortunately, the strategic network formation models show that efficiency and
pairwise stability are often at odds.277 Stable networks may not be efficient, and
efficient networks may not be stable. One reason for this apparent tension is
network effects.278 Decisions to form or sever links produce significant
externalities,279 meaning that individual nodes may not accurately perceive the
overall costs and benefits to the network.280 A second reason is that networks
with a few highly connected hubs may be efficient, but the less-connected nodes
will then have incentives to connect directly, undermining the disproportionate
power of the hubs.281
Another class of strategic network formation models uses the engineering
concept of optimization rather than purely game-theoretic approaches.282 Under
a highly optimized tolerance (“HOT”) model, network nodes seek the optimal
balance between conflicting incentives to minimize cost and maximize value for
the network as a whole.283 Cost is an important constraint in the real world,
where some links are more expensive to construct than others. A link across a
large physical distance may be too costly to build, even though it would
significantly improve the connectivity of a given node. In the HOT model, nodes
balance a cost constraint (minimizing the physical distance to other connected
nodes), against a value constraint (shortening the number of hops to the central
network hubs). The magnitude of both the cost and value variables will lead the
network to evolve into a more or less centrally clustered structure.

277

See Jackson & Wolinsky, supra note 270, at 59-60.

278

See infra Part IV.B.1.

279 An externality is a cost or benefit from an action that the actor itself does not
naturally perceive or take into account when choosing to act or refrain from acting.
Pollution from factories is a classic negative externality.
280

See Jackson, supra note 24, at 319.

281

See id. at 349-50. This is essentially the scale-free dynamics described below.

282

See Alderson & Willinger, supra note 240, at 96.

283 See J.M. Carlson & John Doyle, Highly Optimized Tolerance: A Mechanism for
Power Laws in Designed Systems, 60 PHYSICAL REV. E 1412, 1423-26 (1999) [hereinafter
Carlson & Doyle, Mechanism for Power]; J.M. Carlson & John Doyle, Highly Optimized
Tolerance: Robustness and Design in Complex Systems, 84 PHYSICAL REV. LETTERS
2529, 2529 (2000) [hereinafter Carlson & Doyle, Robustness and Design].
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The network formation studies offer a rich and multi-dimensional picture of
how networks grow and develop. Intriguingly, their findings are consistent with
two other major insights of network science — small worlds and scale-free
distributions. Adding these concepts provides an even clearer picture of how and
why networks such as the Internet come together and then fragment.

C. Disproportionate Power: Small Worlds and Scale-Free Dynamics
Among the most notable discoveries of network science are two surprising
properties of many networks: “small-worlds” behavior and scale-free patterns.
Each has significant legal and policy implications. Specifically, small worlds and
scale-free distributions although expressing different concepts, both mean that
some nodes or clusters of the network can attain disproportionate power merely
through natural network processes. These insights are consistent with the
findings of network formation theory that networks may reach an equilibrium
with a small number of dominant hubs. They further illustrate how some actors
in an environment such as the Internet can take advantage of inter-connectivity
to produce an environment that ultimately undermines the network.
1. It is a small world after all
The small-worlds phenomenon is embodied in the famous concept of “six
degrees of separation,” immortalized in a popular play and movie of the same
name.284 The original concept came from an experiment that psychologist
Stanley Milgram conducted in the 1960s.285 Milgram asked a group of people to
send a letter to someone they knew, who could in turn pass it along to a particular
unknown recipient in another state. It took approximately six steps on average
for the letters that were received at the final destination. Given the population
and geographical dispersion of the United States, this was a shockingly small
number.286 Similar findings appear in a wide variety of networks. For example,

284

See generally JOHN GUARE, SIX DEGREES OF SEPARATION (1992).

285 Stanley Milgram, The Small World Problem, PSYCHOL. TODAY, May 1967, at 60,
60-68 (1967).

Contrary to popular belief, Milgram’s experiment did not prove that there are only
six degrees of separation between any two people. For example, only letters that arrived
at the destination were counted. Three-fourths never got there. See Judith S. Kleinfeld,
The Small World Problem, SOC’Y, Jan.-Feb. 2002, at 61, 62-64. The significance of
Milgram’s work is that it showed the presence of short paths through the network, in the
days before computer simulations could demonstrate such behavior formally.
286
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there are an average of less than four links between any two actors (treating costarring in a movie as a link),287 and only about three hyperlinks on average
between documents in a sampling of 50 million World Wide Web pages.288
In the 1990s, network scientists, most prominently Duncan Watts,289
generalized and explained the operation of the small-worlds phenomenon. The
diameter of a network — the average number of links between any two arbitrary
nodes — tends to grow much more slowly than the number of nodes. In other
words, two users on a big network can reach each other without traversing many
more links than they would on a small network.291 In a famous paper, Watts and
Steven Strogatz showed how a simple network with only local connections
between adjacent nodes (and therefore a large diameter between distant nodes)
could turn into a small world through the random insertion of a few “shortcut”
connections.292
A small number of long-distance links transforms the
connectivity patterns of the network.
From a network formation perspective, the small-worlds phenomena can be
explained as a strategic equilibrium among network participants.293 Most links
are local. Long-distance links are costly to create and usually involve weaker
connections. Long-distance links are therefore rare. Once established, however,
long-distance links are a source of significant value-creation because they
dramatically shorten paths across the entire network.294 Viewed another way, the

287 See Duncan J. Watts & Steven H. Strogatz, Collective Dynamics of “Small World”
Networks, 393 NATURE 440, 441 tbl.1 (1998). A humorous parlor game called Six Degrees
of Kevin Bacon takes advantage of this fact to trace the relationship of any actor through a
chain of co-stars to Kevin Bacon. WATTS, supra note 228, at 93-95.
288 See Lada Adamic, The Small World Web, 1696 LECTURE NOTES COMPUTER SCI. 443,
444 (1999), available at http://www.springerlink.com/content/ 4fjgx8c7m92nqe05/
fulltext.pdf.
289

See generally WATTS, supra note 228 (elaborating on small worlds phenomenon).

In addition to being small worlds, social networks also tend to be highly clustered.
This means that if one node in a linked pair connects to a different node, the second node
in the pair is likely to as well, forming a triangular structure. The coexistence of small
worlds and clustering is surprising. The former suggests that there are many longdistance “shortcuts” across the network, while the latter implies that nodes are densely
interconnected with their close neighbors.
The Watts-Strogatz model showed
theoretically how such network properties could emerge simultaneously. See Watts &
Strogatz, supra note 287, at 441.
291

292

See id.

293

See Jackson, supra note 248, at 27-28.

294 This work parallels the findings of sociologists and management scholars, such as
Ronald Burt of the University of Chicago, who study the effects of social capital in
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long-distance links control valuable assets, not because they are bottlenecks in
the traditional market power sense, but because they reduce the effective network
diameter for everyone else. Those who control such network shortcuts, whether
address databases that facilitate connections to distant websites or the search
engines that send users to the distant reaches of the Web, are in an enviable
economic position.
Moreover, the entire Internet is a collection of long-distance links between
discrete, locally connected networks.295 Although the Internet appears to be
smooth and featureless, it is actually a group of islands with links between them.
There are fewer of those links than one might imagine, and their importance to
the network as a whole is greater than it appears.
2. Scale-free networks: the rich get richer
Network science’s second prominent finding is scale-free dynamics.
Researchers, including Albert-László Barabási, developed the theory of scale-free
networks based on the observation that in many networks, some nodes are vastly
more connected than others.296 For example, the most connected pages on the
Web, the most connected electric power substations in the Western United
States, and the most active protein in the metabolism of yeasts are all orders of
magnitude more connected than the average node in those networks.297 Put
another way, the frequency of different connectivity levels of nodes (formally
known as the degree of those nodes) is not a bell curve (Gaussian) distribution in
which medium levels of connectivity are most common and high or low
connectivity is relatively uncommon. It is instead a power-law distribution,
meaning that each degree of connectivity is exponentially more rare.298 This
produces a distribution curve with a narrow, tall “head” and a long, fat “tail.” A

business. See generally RONALD BURT, STRUCTURAL HOLES: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF
COMPETITION (1992) (illustrating the value of long-distance links in business).
295

See supra Part II.B.

See generally ALBERT-LÁSZLÓ BARABÁSI, LINKED: HOW EVERYTHING IS CONNECTED
EVERYTHING ELSE AND WHAT IT MEANS (2002) (describing the major findings of
network science).
296

TO

297

See Newman, supra note 234, at 187.

298 The term “scale-free” arises from the fact that no level of connectivity is typical for
the network. The function for describing the curve is exponential. Represented
graphically, the “long tail” curve has a head that is extremely high and narrow, but a tail
that is extremely long and flat.
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tiny number of nodes have massive numbers of links, and very many nodes have
few or no links.
The scale-free pattern arises from a phenomenon known as preferential
attachment.299 When new nodes join the network, they do not connect randomly
to other nodes.300 They are more likely to connect to nodes that are already well
connected. For example, a new link on the Web is more likely to point to an
already-popular site because those are the sites most people are familiar with and
find interesting. When new Internet users ask their friends what search engine to
use, they are most likely to tell them to use Google. When a new network
backbone seeks a peering relationship, it is more likely to first approach the
largest, best connected existing network.
Both the physical routers making up the Internet and the links connecting
web pages exhibit a scale-free structure.301 Network theorists have concluded
from this that the Internet is both more stable and more vulnerable than
previously thought.302 It is more stable because the vast majority of nodes are
relatively unimportant and can be knocked out without significant effects on
network-wide connectivity. Conversely, it is more vulnerable because a few key
nodes are so densely connected that a coordinated attack on them would quickly
break up the network.303 Consistent with the network formation analysis, the
Internet turns out to be both robust and at risk at the same time.304
The scale-free dynamics of the Internet are dangerous because those
participants that are not at the top of the power-law curve may choose
balkanization over losing out to the most connected node.305 Remember that, as

See generally BARABÁSI, supra note 296 (discussing preferential attachment and
related concepts).
299

300 Hence, the basic Erdős-Rényi random graph model fails to account for significant
properties in observed real-world networks. See Erdős & Rényi, supra note 253, at 29097. Modifications to the random graph model can, however, produce scale-free behavior.
301

See id.

302 See Andres Guadamuz, Scale-Free Law: Network Science and Copyright, 70 ALB.
L. REV. 1297, 1304 (2008).

See Albert, supra note 240, at 380-81. But see Andrei Broder et al., Graph
Structure in the Web, 33 COMPUTER NETWORKS 309, 309-10 (2000) (offering more
nuanced picture of large scale structure of Web); Cooper, supra note 241, at 24.
303

304

See Jackson, supra note 248, at 12; supra Part III.B.2.

That appears to be what is happening in several of the case studies above. See
supra Part II.
305
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the network formation literature demonstrated, the shift from a network that
offers near-universal connectivity to disconnected islands can be abrupt.306 Just
as a small-world network is unusually dependent on its few “shortcut” links, a
scale-free network is unusually dependent on its dominant nodes.307
Sociologist Saskia Sassen makes an analogous point in her analysis of cities
and globalization.308 Even as production is increasingly distributed around the
globe, she notes, management functions and their associated support services
become increasingly centralized in a few highly concentrated “global cities.”309
This creates risks of catastrophic failure, especially as poorly connected regions
fail to reap the promised benefits of global connectivity. Sassen points out that
cyberspace, being embedded in the larger dynamics of society, is not immune
from these forces.310 Thus, the countervailing pressures of centralization and
decentralization within society also operate directly on the Internet. Sassen’s
analysis illustrates how universal system dynamics can have tremendous realworld consequences. The Internet is not immune from the tensions of
globalization. Its fate may be an illustration of them.
As this Part has shown, theoretical models of networks tell a story that is
entirely consistent with the general dynamic of a network at war with itself

306 See supra Part III.B.2. In scale-free networks, other aspects of network structure
influence the likelihood of a phase transition between lightly connected and highly
connected networks, as compared to random graphs where the relative number of links to
nodes is the primary variable. See Newman, supra note 234, at 225-28.
307 Random network formation models can be modified to incorporate preferential
attachment, and thereby produce scale-free networks. See Jackson, supra note 248, at
16-17. The strategic network formation models have a more difficult time accounting for
this phenomenon. They treat link formation as an economic weighing of costs and
benefits, rather than a decision shaped by previous behavior.

See Sassen, supra note 62, at 21 (“[W]hile regionally oriented firms need not
negotiate the complexities of international borders and the regulations of different
countries, they are still faced with a regionally dispersed network of operations that
requires centralized control and servicing.”).
308

See generally SASKIA SASSEN, THE GLOBAL CITY (2001) (explaining the concept of
global cities); Sassen, supra note 62, at 15 (“This dynamic of simultaneous geographic
dispersal and concentration is one of the key elements in the organizational architecture
of the global economic system.”).
309

Saskia Sassen, The Topoi of E-Space: Global Cities and Global Value Chains, in
SARAI READER 01:
THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 24, 24-25 (2001), available at
http://www.sarai.net/publications/readers/01-the-public-domain (follow “The Topoi of
E Space: Global cities and global value chains – Saskia Sassen – 24” hyperlink); cf. Julie
Cohen, Cyberspace and/or Space, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 210, 212-13 (2007) (describing
interrelationship of cyberspace and physical space).
310
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outlined in Part I, and the stories of Internet balkanization in practice in Part II.
The remaining question is what, if anything, should be done about this trend.

IV. ONE NETWORK OR MANY?
The choice facing policy makers today is whether to allow the Internet to
fragment, or to reinforce the norms that helped to pull it together. The dynamics
of network formation, small worlds, and scale-free structures will produce a more
balkanized environment unless external regulatory forces are brought to bear.
An examination of the Internet’s history shows that open federation of disparate
systems creates innumerable benefits. Network effects, a fundamental concept
that has been incorporated into network science, sharpens the explanation of why
the composite structure of the Internet creates value that independent networks
could not.311
Regulators, legislators, and courts should promote the continued integration
of networks and systems into the interoperable Internet. Historical examples,
such as the privatization of the Internet backbone, show that government can
simultaneously facilitate both interconnection and competition. Federation and
uniformity are not the best answer in every situation, but the modeling
techniques of network science provide a rich toolkit to assess the implications of
different network structures.
This Part suggests some guidelines to aid policy makers in mapping network
science to network law and regulation. Subpart A offers an historical and
technical picture of how the Internet became such as unifying force, illustrating
the role of conscious design. Subpart B explains the economics of network
effects, and how they further explain the benefits of a federated Internet. Finally,
Subpart C offers some initial thoughts for translating these concepts into
prospective policy decisions.

311

See infra Part IV.B.1.
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A. How the Internet Came Together
1. The ends as the means
One of the central lessons of network science is that the same collection of
actors will produce different results based on the way their connections are
wired.312 In other words, the characteristics of networks strongly influence their
ultimate utility.313 The Internet and the public switched telephone network
(“PSTN”) use the same physical infrastructure. However, their economic and
social outputs are very different, for example, because their connections are
structured differently. The PSTN is a “circuit-switched” network in which
powerful phone company switches control the flow of information. The Internet
is a “packet-switched” network, which decentralizes traffic management to the
real-time decisions of individual routers.314
The dominant project of cyberlaw is to parse the implications of the Internet’s
structural rules or “code.”315 Legal scholars seeking to explain the Internet’s
dynamism as a unified platform have emphasized a particular structural factor:
the so-called “end-to-end” model.316 An end-to-end network is one that pushes
control out to the endpoints.317 The network focuses on moving bits from one
place to another, without considering what those bits contain. Any edge device,

312 See generally Yannis Ioannides, Random Graphs and Social Networks:
An
Economics Perspective (Tufts Dep’t of Econ., Working Paper No. 518, 2006) (explaining
how network science improves on overly simplistic economic models that merely
aggregate individuals); supra Part III (EXPLANATORY PARENTHETICAL).
313 See WATTS, supra note 228, at 244 (“The structure of the network can have as
great an influence on the success or failure of an innovation as the inherent appeal of the
innovation itself.”).
314 A packet-switched network routes individual packets, which are small chunks of
data, while a circuit-switched network keeps open the same circuit for an entire call. See
Werbach, supra note 42, at 17. The distinction between packet and circuit switching is
one of many structural differences between the Internet and the PSTN. See id.
315

See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 107-108 (1999).

The classic statement of the end-to-end model was a 1981 paper by computer
scientists Jerome Saltzer, David Clark, and David Reed. See Jerome Saltzer et al., Endto-End Arguments in System Design, 2 ACM TRANSACTIONS ON COMPUTER SYS. 277, 278
(1984). Its implications for innovation were later famously explained in the work of
David Isenberg and Lawrence Lessig. See LESSIG, supra note 194, at 34-35; David
Isenberg, The Rise of the Stupid Network, COMPUTER TELEPHONY, Aug. 1997, at 16, 16;
Mark Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-to-End: Preserving the Architecture of
the Internet in the Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L. REV. 925, 931 (2001).
316

317

See Saltzer et al., supra note 316, at 278.
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such as a computer or mobile phone, can add a new application, and those edge
devices are solely responsible for factors such as reliability and security that
ensure the success of that application. Because innovations do not require the
consent or updating of the network core, those innovations can be deployed more
quickly.318 As edge devices become more powerful, which they do as computing
power improves over time, their enhancements can immediately be joined to the
network. So, new services such as Google, Skype, Hotmail, Facebook, and
Amazon.com can catch on and grow rapidly, generating significantly more social
and economic benefits than in a network like the PSTN, where central control
nodes must approve new features.319
The end-to-end model emphasizes only one side of the equation — the edges.
The Internet gives extraordinary power to its endpoints, but it also embodies
linkages between those endpoints, and between aggregations of systems that
connect into a composite network. The fact that the edges of the network define
the applications say nothing about how those edges are wired together. An
endpoint can offer a brilliant innovation, but such innovation will be of no value
if other endpoints cannot access it, or cannot access it easily.320 Something more
than the end-to-end principle must explain how the Internet holds together.
2. Connected by design
Like any network, the Internet is, to a great extent, a product of the design
parameters under which it was created.321 While the end-to-end model
accurately describes the orientation of the engineers who designed the Internet, it
was a retroactive explanation of the network’s architecture, rather than a
guideline for its design.322 The actual development of the Internet focused not on
the edges, but on the links.
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See Lemley & Lessig, supra note 316, at 930-31.

See id. at 931; Zittrain, supra note 137, at 2021-22. Zittrain argues that, absent
intervention, the edge devices on the Internet will increasingly be locked-down, specialpurpose devices, rather than the general-purpose computers that generate innovation.
See Zittrain, supra note 137, at 1977-78, 2002.
319

The “ease” of access may involve several dimensions, including cost, speed, and
reliability.
320

321

See generally Varnelis, supra note 62 (discussing design parameters of Internet).

322 The Saltzer, Clark, and Reed paper that articulated the end-to-end principle was
published nearly a decade after the basic Internet protocols were adopted. See Saltzer et
al., supra note 316, at 278.
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Histories of the Internet typically trace its ancestry from broad concepts such
as packet switching, developed by Paul Baran, to the first implementation in the
ARPANet of the U.S. Department of Defense, to the civilian NSFNet, to its
commercialization and privatization into the Internet we know today.323 While
not inaccurate, such a timeline de-emphasizes the key shift in moving from the
ARPANet to the Internet: the emphasis on internetworking. The ARPANet was a
single, integrated network. The NSFNet, and the fully private Internet that
succeeded it, were collections of interconnected but separately managed
networks.
For those who created it, the Internet had one paramount objective: it was
designed to transport packets of data transparently across a network of
networks.324 It is hard to imagine today, when the Internet is synonymous with
data connectivity, but there were already research and academic networks before
the Internet came about. The difference was that these networks were typically
limited to local systems or specific services.325 The Internet was designed to
break down those boundaries.
The Internet protocol was designed to be lightweight enough to ride on top of
any available network infrastructure.326
Other protocols and their
implementations followed “Postel’s Law,” named after Jon Postel, one of the key
members of the Internet engineering community.327 Postel’s dictate, in order to

323

See Werbach, supra note 42, at 13-16; supra text accompanying note 43.

See David Clark, The Design Philosophy of the DARPA Internet Protocols, ACM
SIGCOMM COMPUTER COMM. REV., Aug. 1988, at 106, 106, available at
www.cs.princeton.edu/~jrex/teaching/spring2005/reading/clark88.pdf. It would, of
course, be an oversimplification to label interconnectivity the sole purpose of the
Internet. Other goals, such as robustness, supporting a wide range of possible
applications, demonstrating the feasibility of wide-area packet networking, and
supporting research applications, were also significant. Moreover, the Internet we know
today developed through an evolutionary process, involving many contributors.
However, effective internetworking was the most significant design element of the
system. See id. at 106-10.
324

The shift from local, purpose-specific networking parallels the shift in the
computing world from single-function devices such as calculators and word processors to
general purpose personal computers. Cf. Zittrain, supra note 137, at 1975-76.
325

See G. Keith Cambron, The Next Generation Network and Why We’ll Never See It,
COMM. MAG., Oct. 2006, at 8, 10 (“IP’s greatest contribution is its ability to switch
information across diverse networks, independent of the underlying technology; the
greatest legacy of IP is the universal acceptance of the address scheme and message
structure.”).
326

327 See Jon Postel, Info. Sciences Inst., Transmission Control Protocol:
DARPA
Internet Program Protocol Specification, at ii (Sept. 1981) (Request for Comments No.
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enhance cooperation among separately managed networks, was:
“be
328
conservative in what you do, be liberal in what you accept from others.”
Most
of the other technical innovations that allow the Internet to function, such as the
ingenious congestion management schemes that operate without central
regulatory mechanisms and the distributed databases supporting the DNS, were
developed for internetworking. Even the end-to-end approach, now emphasized
primarily for its effects on innovation, had its roots in internetworking. In an
end-to-end network, connectivity does not depend on enhancements baked into a
particular network. Edge devices are free to communicate and establish new
applications, regardless of what network infrastructure they sit on.
Significant consequences flow from the fact that interconnectivity, and not
some other objective, is the baseline goal embedded in the Internet’s architecture.
The Internet is a complex, engineered system, and such systems necessarily
involve tradeoffs.329 Had the Internet been designed primarily to ensure
reliability, security, or effective billing of real-time voice communications traffic,
it would have turned out quite differently.330 In particular, designs for
internetworking have to create both incentives and the opportunities for isolated
systems to come together.
Describing the Internet in these terms runs counter to the tenor of most
cyberlaw scholarship. Because the end-to-end model focuses on the network’s
edges, it can over-emphasize the degrees of freedom those edges enjoy.331
Moreover, perspectives that generalize about edges of “the Internet” miss how
those edges are themselves embedded in component networks that are tightly
interconnected.

793), http://www.faqs.org/rfcs/rfc793.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2008).
supervised the assignment of Internet addresses.
328

Postel also

Id. at 13.

329 See Alderson & Willinger, supra note 240, at 94. The HOT models of network
development demonstrate how tradeoffs between competing incentives in networks can
produce instabilities and shape network performance. See Carlson & Doyle, Mechanism
for Power, supra note 283, at 1424; Carlson & Doyle, Robustness and Design, supra note
283, at 2529.
330 Under those circumstances, the Internet would have looked like the public
switched telephone network.
331 Zittrain’s “generativity” model acknowledges that network edges may no longer be
so unconstrained. See Zittrain, supra note 137, at 1995-96. However, his perspective still
concentrates on the behavior of the edge devices, rather than the network links that tie
them to networks, and networks to each other.
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B. Federated Network Effects
1. Bigger is better
The clearest reason why an interconnected, federated architecture creates so
much value on the Internet is the phenomenon of network effects.332 Though it is
consistent with network formation theory, the economic concept of network
effects predates the development of network science.333 The basic idea is that
participants on the network benefit from the presence of other participants. To
take a simple example, my friend’s decision to purchase a mobile phone also
benefits me, because I can now call her more easily. In economic terms, there is a
positive externality to her decisions to join the network. A bigger network is thus
more valuable, independent of any scale or scope economies for its creators.
One consequence of network effects is that the network becomes more
valuable as it grows.334 A bigger network gives users access to more other users,
and to more content or services that can be delivered through the network. This
principle means that growth and interconnectivity magnify the social welfare
benefits of the Internet. In this environment, the benefit to each user grows with
additional users. A group of distinct networks, such as the consumer online
services that were prevalent immediately before the rise of the Internet, may in
aggregate connect the same number of users. However, each user will have
access to a smaller universe of other users, or of services on the network
platform. The overall utility of this network configuration will be inferior to the
Internet, which connects all users.335

332 See Lemley & McGowan, supra note 41, at 483 (“‘Network effects’ refers to a group
of theories clustered around the question whether and to what extent standard economic
theory must be altered in cases in which ‘the utility that a user derives from consumption
of a good increases with the number of other agents consuming the good.’”).

333

The foundational work on network effects in information industries was
performed in the 1980s. See ARTHUR, supra note 35, at 1-4; Michael L. Katz & Carl
Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 424,
424 (1985); see also SHAPIRO & VARIAN, supra note 189, at 173-225 (detailing economic
implications of “positive feedback” in network industries).
334 See STEVEN M. SURANOVIC, Chapter 80-1: Economies of Scale and Returns to
Scale, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE THEORY AND POLICY, http://internationalecon.com/
Trade/Tch80/ T80-1.php (last visited Oct. 31, 2008).
335 The issue is not just the scale and scope efficiencies of larger networks. These are
questions of supply-side economies, which classical economics has long considered.
Network effects is a demand-side phenomenon. See Lemley & McGowan, supra note 41,
at 484.
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These network effects also suggest that, even absent anti-competitive
behavior, network industries may tend toward concentration. New entrants may
find it difficult to catch an early market leader, because the larger network is
inherently more valuable to users. Network effects have been used to explain
how AT&T gained a commanding advantage in the early days of telephone service
over smaller independent telephone companies, how Microsoft built and
preserved a monopoly in personal computer operating systems, and how social
networking site MySpace achieved a dominant market position, even facing highprofile competitors.336
2. Benefits of federation
In a 1998 article, Mark Lemley and David McGowan surveyed the
implications of network effects for various areas of the law.337 They concluded
that, although network effects offer significant insights in fields such as antitrust,
intellectual property, and communications law, courts and regulators often apply
the concept carelessly or incorrectly.338 In adversarial legal processes, partisans
are incentivized to stretch the postulates of network effects theory to match their
desired outcomes, sometimes beyond what the theory can justify.339 Moreover,
network effects themselves are often indeterminate. In real-world situations,
their implications depend more on the particular dynamics of the relevant
industry than on the general principles of the formal model.340 Lemley and
McGowan therefore urged a cautious approach to incorporating network effects
into the law, adopting the least sweeping rule consistent with the theory.341
There has been significant legal and economic scholarship on the implications
of network effects for telecommunications and the Internet.342 As Lemley and
McGowan explain, network effects do not necessarily mean that the largest player

336

See id. at 549-51.

337

See id.

338

See id. at 609-11.

339

See id. at 562.

See id. at 609-11. This parallels the criticism leveled by Spulber and Yoo. They
point out that the primary variable determining the magnitude of network effects — the
size of the network — is often too coarse to be useful for policy determinations. As they
note, the structure of networks, which graph theory models, may be more significant than
their size in many cases. See Spulber & Yoo, supra note 229, at 1690-92.
340

341

See Lemley & McGowan, supra note 41, at 593.

342

See id. at 546-61.
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will dominate potential competitors.343 In a networked system such as the
Internet, network effects push toward a single universal platform.344 However,
that need not be a monopoly network controlled by a single provider. When
compatible standards allow networks to interconnect and federate, a single
internetwork such as the Internet or today’s multi-provider telecommunications
market is an equally valid configuration.345 The durability of the Internet
backbone market as a relatively competitive environment is testament to the fact
that the rich do not always get richer.
In other words, the network effects literature suggests that, in a networked
environment such as the Internet, there are powerful incentives toward either of
two potential market structures: a single dominant firm, or an interconnected
environment of many firms using common standards. The Internet has
primarily, but not exclusively, followed the latter path. As explained above, the
network was from the beginning designed for standardized interconnection, and
for many years it was operated under cultural and economic conditions that
reinforced that structure.346 For applications, the common standards of the Web
and the separation of applications from connectivity create an environment of
easy entry.347 However, other aspects of the network are more centralized. For
example, consolidation of power in the Internet backbone has raised antitrust
concerns.348 And the Internet addressing system points back to central “root

343

See id. at 506.

344

See id.

345

See id. at 549.

The exception was the NSFNet backbone, through which all traffic flowed. The
NSFNet privatization process replaced that central hub with the mesh of competing
backbones that characterizes the Internet today. See generally Kesan & Shaw, supra note
79 (describing the privatization process),
346

One of the reasons the Web triumphed was that a competing application platform
unwisely attempted to exert centralized control. The University of Minnesota tried to
impose licensing fees based on its copyrights in Gopher, a popular Internet navigation
service in the early 1990s. That scared away many sites from adopting it. See Posting of
Yen & Minnesota Gopher Team, yen@boombox.micro.umn.edu, to pacs-l@ uhupvm1.uh.
edu, review@msen.com, com-priv@uu.psi.com (Mar. 11, 1993, 15:08:26 CST)
(http://www.mirrorservice.org/sites/boombox.micro.umn.edu/pub/gopher/gophersoftware-licensing-policy.ancient).
347

See Complaint at 9-11, United States v. WorldCom, No. 00-CV-1526 (D.D.C. June
26, 2000), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f5000/5051.pdf.
348
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servers” managed by one company under an agreement with the U.S. Department
of Commerce.349
The victory of the interconnected outcomes over the centralized ones was
always contingent on historical, regulatory, economic, and cultural factors. The
economics of network effects therefore provide a basis for understanding both
the power of the composite Internet, as well as its fragility. With that in mind,
policy makers can begin to formulate effective responses to the Internet’s
creeping balkanization.

C. Network Science Meets Network Law
This subpart develops some initial ideas for linking the insights in the prior
Parts with normative policy making. Subpart 1 explains the challenge the policy
makers face in the interconnected Internet environment. Subpart 2 shows how
government action and inaction played a role in many of the stories of federation
and balkanization described in Part II. Subpart 3 highlights some early efforts to
apply network models directly to policy-relevant questions.
1. The challenge for law
Traditional legal approaches struggle to explain the fissures emerging on the
Internet today because they are not sensitive enough to the underlying network
structures. The primary legal construct for addressing concentrations of power is
antitrust law. Antitrust enforcement and analogous administrative regulation
have been used in some high-profile cases involving networked industries, such
as the effort to break up Microsoft.350 As the Microsoft case demonstrated,
however, the application of traditional antitrust concepts becomes extremely
challenging in a networked environment.351 The problem is magnified on the
Internet, which is not one networked platform but many platforms tied together
in a complex federation. Moreover, antitrust is designed to break up firms, not
pull them closer together. Yet, as discussed above, the great value of the Internet

349

See supra Part II.A.

350

See supra note 54.

351 See Joseph Farrell & Phil Weiser, Modularity, Vertical Integration, and Open
Access Policies: Towards a Convergence of Antitrust and Regulation in the Internet
Age, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 85, 89 (2003) (describing challenges facing antitrust in
networked “platform” environments, and proposing new framework based on
“internalizing complementary efficiencies”).
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lies in its penchant for connecting systems into common platforms.352 Mandated
fragmentation may reduce market power, as traditionally conceived, but it would
only magnify the balkanization of the Internet.
Similarly, traditional notions of property rights fail to capture the Internet
environment. The Internet is chock full of private property, from the servers that
host its data to the patents that protect particular algorithms. Yet no one owns
the Internet. Again, it is the network of networks that emerges from the
voluntary integration of largely private resources. The Internet is a commons,
which produces value and even facilitates market interactions through the
absence of exclusive property rights.353
When these paradigms collide, the result is legal uncertainty. Book
publishers alarmed at Google’s new Book Search service are correct that Google
stores full-text copies of their copyrighted works on its servers.354 At the same
time, Google is correct that it is providing a new mechanism for discovery of
books, just as it facilitates discovery of several billion other copyrighted
documents on the Web. The courts will resolve this and other disputes with the
tools at hand, but the absence of network-centric frameworks is a significant
handicap.
In a networked environment, location and connectivity within the network
matter. A more secure foundation for Internet law must start with the
recognition that Internet is a composite networked environment.
2. Defining the government role
Network science provides more than just useful analogies to aid in resolution
of Internet-related legal disputes. It offers new tools to assess policy alternatives
for some of the most significant issues in the information economy.355 The
Internet is a network. It is within the class of phenomena that network science
studies. The only difference is that science is fundamentally descriptive, whereas
law is normative. Network science observes the patterns of networks in nature
and tries to explain how and why they behave as they do. Law evaluates the
success of networks in achieving normative goals, and then considers how their
352

See supra Part II.A.

353 See LESSIG, supra note 194, at 26. See generally Frischmann, supra note 37
(analyzing economic implications of commons for Internet infrastructure regulation).
354

See Travis, supra note 206, at 131-39.

355

See supra Part III.
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performance might be improved. That process, however, can still benefit from a
clear understanding of how networks operate.
The project of marrying network science with Internet law is at the early
stages. Even on its own terms, network formation theory has only begun to
incorporate many attributes of real-world networks into its models. Its
explanatory or normative value will depend greatly on the particular issues under
consideration. A closer look at several of the case studies in Part II shows that
public policy often has a significant impact. Reviewing these examples provides a
few generalizations about how network science can inform decision making on
significant Internet law and policy questions.
A key lesson of network science is that the structure of network interactions
can be extremely important.356 The same set of actors may produce different
outcomes depending on the dynamics of their network relationships. By
precluding some linkages, strengthening or weakening others, and mandating
others, both governmental and non-governmental regulators mediated the
potential excesses of the centralizing Internet.
The NSF’s Internet commercialization and privatization effort was
deliberately structured to ensure competition among multiple interconnected
backbones.357 By funding the creation of network access points (“NAPs”) and
forcing the privatized NSFNet backbone to connect to them, the NSF prevented
the most powerful backbone from leveraging network effects to cement its
dominance.358 The default requirement of multilateral peering at the NAPs
provided a baseline around which networks could establish more sophisticated
private relationships. After the NSF exited the stage, the Department of Justice
and FCC, and more recently the competition policy arm of the European Union,
became the primary watchdogs of competitiveness in the backbone market.
Through divestiture requirements and occasional outright prohibitions on
mergers, these government entities helped to preserve a backbone environment
that is both competitive and well connected.359
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See Jackson, supra note 24, at 319.

See Rajiv C. Shah & Jay P. Kesan, The Privatization of the Internet’s Backbone
Network, 51 J. BROAD. & ELEC. MEDIA 93, 95-96, 100, available at
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m6836/is_/ai_n25007515.
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See Kesan & Shaw, supra note 79, at 111-16.

359 See Michael Kende, The Digital Handshake: Connecting Internet Backbones 1820 (FCC Office of Plans & Policy, Working Paper No. 32, Sept. 2000), available at
http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/OPP/working_papers/oppwp32.pdf.
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Government took a similarly assertive, although less visible, role in holding
together the other layers of the Internet. In addressing, the private governance
mechanisms of Jon Postel’s Internet Assigned Numbers Authority were for many
years sufficient for universal adoption of a common platform. Once those
consensual institutions broke down, the Department of Commerce and ICANN
took on the mantle of Internet governance. Despite ICANN’s many failings,
breakaway efforts and movements to wrest control over the root servers have so
far been unsuccessful.
At the application layer, the neutral Internet, in which access providers did
not interfere with applications and content on their networks, grew out of a series
of FCC decisions to limit the power of network operators. Finally, in content, the
safe harbors of the DMCA and Telecom Act provided cover for practices such as
search engine indexing of Web content. These provisions could not have been
written with the intention of addressing the kinds of content sharing that sprung
up after they were adopted. Nonetheless, they are becoming increasingly
significant in the legal calculus for major new Internet-based services such as
YouTube and Google Book Search.360 The statutory safe harbors, along with the
broader fair use exception to copyright liability, provide breathing space for
online content aggregation services that might otherwise run afoul of copyright
silos.
Government has not always been a positive force. The NSI monopoly over
generic top-level domain name registration was entirely a creation of the NSF.
The tensions and uncertainties in copyright law and its application to online
services like Google Book Search result from a combination of action and inaction
by both the legislative and judicial branches of government. The potential
balkanization of IPv6 implementation juxtaposes two governances systems. The
IETF is inclusive but weak in its attempts to push a universal transition to IPv6,
while the top-down Chinese IPv6 effort is ruthlessly effective. Most of the stories
described above in Part II about the breakdown of the composite Internet involve
governments or governmental institutions as at least contributing factors.
3. Early analytical work
There have been some efforts to analyze issues relevant to Internet policy
using network formation theory techniques, albeit not with a legal focus. These
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See Tim Wu, Does YouTube Really Have Legal Problems?, SLATE, Oct. 26, 2006,
http://slate.com/id/2152264.
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have predominantly been in the area of peering.361 For example, researchers
developed a strategic network formation model for the decisions of Internet
backbone networks about whether to peer with one another directly or through a
public exchange point.362 The model showed how network operators would seek
to differentiate their service quality and engage in price discrimination to
maximize revenues, while end-users would prefer a more undifferentiated
environment.363 This mirrors the kinds of conflicts actually emerging among
Internet backbones.
The differentiated services outcome that backbone operators favor is not
necessarily the wrong one from a public policy perspective; the question is
whether the overall benefits (in terms of service innovation and investment in
network capacity) exceed the costs (in terms of increased costs for users). A more
refined model would recognize that physical-layer interconnection also influences
application-layer opportunities, because application and service providers
connect to backbones as well. Again, network formation theory will not offer a
clear-cut suggestion for every Internet policy question. As the scientific field
matures, however, it will offer increasingly valuable guidance about the likely
consequences of intervention into Internet markets.

D. Guidelines for Policy Makers
As a threshold matter, regulators must appreciate what about the Internet
they can and cannot control. Nodes in networks benefit not only from their direct
connections, but from the number and structure of indirect relationships as well.
Individuals and entire networks will react to any external stimuli in the form of
regulatory impositions. The results may be unpredictable, even harmful.364
Achieving a defined policy outcome may not be nearly as simple as it seems.

See generally Alessio D’Ignazio & Emanuele Giovannetti, From Exogenous to
Endogenous Economic Networks: Internet Applications, 20 J. ECON. SURVS. 757 (2006)
(explanatory paren); W.B. Norton, The Art of Peering: The Peering Playbook,
http://www.blogg.ch/uploads/peering-playbook.pdf (describing the business dynamics
of peering decisions).
361

See Narine Badasyan & Subhadip Chakrabarti, Private Peering Among Internet
Backbone Providers 2-5 (Wash. Univ. in St. Louis, Series on Indus. Org., Econ. Working
Paper Archive, No. 0301002, 2003).
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See id. at 21-22.

See Spulber & Yoo, supra note 229, at 1713-16 (criticizing FCC’s interconnection
pricing rules for incumbent telephone companies through graph-theoretic analysis).
364
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Governments can play two primary positive roles in the evolution of the
Internet ecosystem: catalyzing network formation, and moderating the forces
that push towards excessive concentration of power. The first thing governments
can do is to promote the growth of networks themselves. Government action can
reduce both the internal costs of adding links to a network and the external costs
of linking networks together.365 The DARPA and NSF initiatives to fund what
ultimately became the Internet are canonical examples. Today, with the
commercial sector so heavily engaged in the Internet, such direct support is
unnecessary. However, there is room for additional investment in basic research
on the foundations of networks at all layers. Moreover, with only a limited
number of broadband competitors, FCC policies geared towards formation of new
network platforms could have a significant impact.366
The second government function is to prevent networks from becoming their
own worst enemies. Complex adaptive systems are characterized by “tipping
points,” where change suddenly accelerates and becomes difficult to stop.367 The
phase transitions in network growth368 and the potential “lock-in” effects of
network effects369 are examples of this pattern. At certain key moments, aspects
of the Internet may tip toward either concentration of power or interconnected
competition, or even toward the sub-optimal outcome of unconnected islands.
This is the story of peering archipelagos, IPv6 balkanization, DNS fragmentation,
network neutrality vs. diversity, and islands of copyright protection, which are
detailed above in Part II.A-D.
Networks do not necessarily tend towards the overall state that is the most
efficient, welfare maximizing, or socially beneficial.370 Network structures on the
Internet are the product of strategic decisions by many independent agents, who
focus on their own perceived interests rather than those of society. In general,
365

See Jackson, supra note 248, at 13-14; supra Part III.B.2.

366 Such policies would have more than just economic benefits. As Susan Crawford
explains in a recent paper, communications policy should emphasize the broader
opportunities of additional human communication. See Crawford, supra note 39, at 36465.
367 See MALCOLM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING POINT: HOW LITTLE THINGS CAN MAKE A BIG
DIFFERENCE 12 (2000).
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See Jackson, supra note 248, at 12-15.
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See Lemley & McGowan, supra note 41, at 501, 522.

370 See generally Jackson & Wolinsky, supra note 270 (using game-theoretic
techniques to analyze network formation, and distinguishing network stability from
network efficiency).

{Page 70}

The Centripetal Network

Kevin Werbach

such decentralized, market processes produce remarkably good results, for both
economic efficiency and for normative measures of individual welfare.371
On the other hand, market systems can go off the rails. They can produce
inequality, excessive swings in the business cycle, durable monopolies, or other
undesirable results. A small example is the desire of telephone companies to
impose per-minute charges on dial-up ISPs in the mid-1990s.372 Had the FCC
granted this request, the resultant dampening of Internet growth would have far
exceeded the costs of the switch upgrades the phone companies ultimately
adopted. The phone companies themselves would have suffered, because they
would not have enjoyed the increased demand for second lines, data circuits, and
eventually broadband connections for Internet access. Fortunately, the FCC
declined to act on the requests.
In general, government policies that promote cheaper access to network links,
encourage standardization, and restrain excessive concentrations of power at any
layer of the network, may help restrain the inherent pressures for the Internet to
either over-centralize or balkanize. As the discussion of network science
demonstrated, factors such as the density of links relative to the number of
nodes, the cost of links, and the overall size of the network strongly influence the
path that the network will take. Much work remains to map these general
concepts to practical choices in specific regulatory proceedings. However, these
guidelines provide a solid baseline for policy making grounded in fundamental
network dynamics.

CONCLUSION
The story of the Internet is still being written. Though the federation of
distinct networks and the resulting aggregation of power in new hubs were often
design goals, in practice they emerged from the complex interactions of
independent actors. Thoughtful policy decisions may help preserve the better
attributes of an open, interconnected network platform, but there are no
guarantees. A fragmented Internet would forfeit many of the positive network

See generally FRIEDRICH HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944) (explaining
superiority of decentralized market-based economies over centralized socialist
approaches).
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See Werbach, supra note 42, at 48-51.
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effects that have driven extraordinary growth in innovation over the past decade.
Uniformity, however, also imposes costs. Some balkanization of the Internet may
create space for experimentation and incentives for new kinds of innovation. The
potential value of such developments should be weighed against the potential
costs and uncertainties inherent in such a course. Network science can help
policy makers make better choices for the future of the world’s most important
information and communications platform.
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